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Abstract 
This thesis is an attempt to understand how networking can be used as a tool to accomplish 
success in a third world country for foreign entrepreneurs. By using a theoretical framework 
which includes the terms “Networking”, “Culture” and “Knowledge”, the goal is to discuss 
how foreign entrepreneurs alter their use of networking through the different stages of an 
entrepreneurial process. The thesis is limited to its presentation of one case study of a 
business run by two Norwegians and one native Tanzanian.  
The case study is the result of interviewing, observing and interacting with members of Paka 
Adventures Ltd, a tourism business established by two Norwegians with the help from their 
native Tanzanian friends. Through the experiences and stories of the entrepreneurs and other 
key members of the business, the case study will present empirical data in the form of a 
narrative story, which will describe the entrepreneurial process of Paka Adventures, from the 
stage where the idea of the business emerged and up to their current stage of growth and 
development. The narrative will include challenges of doing business in Tanzania, and how 
different conflicting situations were solved through the use of networking. 
The analysis argues how networks change during an entrepreneurial process, and discuss its 
use to secure a business and its resources in the entrepreneurial culture of Tanzania. The main 
findings, discussed within the range of this thesis’ theoretical framework, enhance the 
qualities a network provides entrepreneurs when starting a business in an unknown culture. 
Essentially, distrust in the general business culture would seem to force the foreign 
entrepreneurs to use networking as a tool to gain security. This thesis will also provide an 
understanding on how small businesses, in the start-up stage of doing business in Tanzania, 
can achieve entrepreneurial success through including elements of culture and knowledge 
through social capital.   
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1. Introduction 
Spilling (2008) states that: “no entrepreneur will succeed, regardless of engagement and work 
effort, if not he or she has anyone to interact with” (p. 60). This thesis examines the use of 
networking throughout an entrepreneurial process performed by two Norwegian entrepreneurs 
in Tanzania. The aim is to understand how foreign entrepreneurs practice networking to 
successfully establish and develop a business in an unknown culture. To be able to give a 
holistic understanding of the entrepreneurial process for foreign entrepreneurs, it became 
important to include elements that shapes and affect the practice of networking. A successful 
entrepreneur is, according to Lavoie (1991), is not only a person who can understand and 
contribute in different conversations with the surroundings, but also a person who is 
especially anchored in his or hers cultural context. To be able to contextualize the culture of 
doing business in Tanzania for this otherwise synchronic thesis, I will now present a short 
introduction on the history of Tanzania, before I will present the current thematic situation of 
the country. This introduction will provide a small insight into the background of Tanzania, 
and illuminate how it ended up in today’s current situation, in regards to their rather weak 
entrepreneurial culture 
Berry (1971) states that in 1961, Tanganyika, as Tanzania was called at that time, became an 
independent state from the British colonial rule. Taganyika is made up of the areas Tanzania, 
the mainland and Zanzibar, which is the Islands of Unguja and Pemba in the Indian Ocean. In 
1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar united and formed the country which is today called 
Tanzania. Geographically, Tanzania is located in East Africa, bordered by the Indian Ocean 
from the east, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo from the west, 
Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique from the south, and Uganda and Kenya from the north. 
Lugalla (1997) explains how the focus of economic development in Tanzania started in 1967 
in the city of Arusha, through what has been called The Arusha Declaration. At this point, the 
economy was challenged by rapid population growth, which had caused increased poverty 
and unemployment in urban areas. The Arusha Declaration was an attempt to compose 
policies which would decrease poverty and bring economic progress for all Tanzanians. In 
mid 1970s however, Tanzania faced social and economic crisis, as agricultural production 
declined, which caused a loss in foreign earnings and affected the government of the country. 
Wages decreased rapidly, and the government failed to provide even minimum social 
services. As a result, more people became self-employed.  
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Structural adjustment policies (SAPs), high-powered austerity programs implemented in 
many countries across the globe since the early 1980s and propelled by international financial 
loans tied to IMF/World Bank, Grosen and Coskun (2010) explain that these SAPs provided 
strategies of increasing productivity in the Tanzanian nation in the mid 1980’s, for example; 
liberalization, democracy and removal of agricultural subsidies. Implementing such strategies 
increased the country’s revenues, and led to an increase in GDP, which is still growing. 
Nevertheless, the country is still poor, especially local people within rural communities, 
because the economic growth, according to Lugalla (1997), was only seen in, and was 
beneficial to, the government sectors. 
Following the recent report from International Business (2014), the estimated number of 
people living in Tanzania is around 48.2 million, and the country experiences a rapid 
economic growth rate of 6.9 percent making it the third fastest growing country in Africa. The 
Tanzanian government has, nevertheless, many challenges to face in terms of maintaining and 
further develop their growth. The population in Tanzania may double in just 25 years, due to 
decreasing death rates and increasing birth rates, and as 44 percent of the population is under 
15 years old today, Tanzania has a great work force potential. On the other hand, the annual 
«Doing Business Report» by The World Bank (2014) states that Tanzania is ranked as 
number 145 in regards of ease in starting a business, out of 189 countries. High poverty rates, 
low educational quality, a lack of capacity to improve the needed physical and social 
infrastructure for the coming work force, and a high level of corruption, are all factors 
influencing this low ranking. 
The World Bank Report “Tanzania Economic Update. Who Wants a Job? The magnetic 
Power of Cities” (2014a), states that most of the inhabitants of Tanzania, around 96 percent, is 
currently employed, which indicates a very low unemployment rate of four percent. This 
number masks the true problem however. The wages are too low to keep the inhabitants of 
Tanzania above the poverty line. A big portion of the employment in these areas is under 
small unproductive non-farm enterprises, which does not have the capability to grow and 
become competitive in the current market. Part of the problem is that the business owners 
have limited skills, and they often establish businesses to survive. The businesses are 
therefore often very young, informal and have no specialized workforce. The scale of the 
businesses is also quite small, where over 90 percent consists of two or less employees, 
including the owner. They often have a short shelf life, and only 4 out of 10 businesses 
survive, let alone grow. To change the economic climate in Tanzania, one would have to 
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change these businesses into paths for economic growth, as well as open up more 
opportunities for employment in the area. In the current climate it is not realistic for these 
businesses to grow. Duplicating the process of the firms that have managed to grow and 
flourish is therefore vital to the further economic growth of Tanzania. These firms have a 
greater capability and economic overhang to overcome the challenges they face in the 
economic environment in Tanzania. On the other hand, the small scale businesses will face 
even larger challenges, because of the high financial and human resources required to 
succeed. The level of education in Tanzania further complicates the issue. Only 12 percent of 
the population completes secondary education, and most of the population receives only seven 
years of schooling. This leads to a large uneducated labor force. The uneducated and low skill 
levelled labor force leads to further obstacles for the growth of small businesses. There are 
also issues when it comes to the cost of transportation. The congestion costs are very 
disproportionate when it is reflected against the average income. The residents of Dar Es 
Salaam have to spend approximately 34 percent for their monthly income on transportation. 
This cost lowers the available resources and productive time needed to operate and grow a 
business (World Bank 2014a). 
Furthermore, the Tanzanian business climate according to the World Bank (2014b), is 
characterized by corruption, confusing labor laws and unnecessary administrative burdens. 
These are all factors that put a strain on the formalization of doing business in Tanzania. The 
business culture is saturated with distrust, due to continuously changes in policies, an 
unpredictable judicial system, and the excessive time spent on mitigation strategies, instead of 
producing more strategies for stimulating business activities. It can therefore be understood 
that Tanzania is not a country with tradition of supporting entrepreneurial activity. The 
government needs to address the need of creating productive jobs for the fast growing labour 
force to establish measures to prevent Tanzanian cities from becoming metropolis slums. 
Currently, the job market in Tanzania consists of 23 million Tanzanians, and this number is 
estimated to reach 45 million by 2030 according to The World Bank (2014a).   
Tanzania is climbing the ladder to more economic stability anyway, due to the increasingly 
high interest from international investors. The recipe to become a successful business in 
Tanzania will, according to International Business Report (2014), include to 1) act fast, 2) 
avoid participation in corruption of any kind, 3) understand the culture, and 4) be able to 
create long- term relations with the local communities. 
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Theories on networks and networking have produced a large volume of literature, and have 
become increasingly popular. I found it difficult however, to find significant empirical 
evidence of the use of networking in unknown cultural contexts. In a lot of the literature 
regarding networks in different stages of the entrepreneurial process, such as Greve and Salaff 
(2007) and Maderapperuma (2011), there is a lack of inclusion of the cultural aspect. I found 
it interesting to research the challenges foreign entrepreneurs may meet, due to lack of 
knowledge of the cultural practices, values and norms in the environment, and how 
networking can be used to gain security and profitable success.  
The following question has been formed during the writing process of this paper:  
How does the role of networking change during different stages of the entrepreneurial 
process for foreign entrepreneurs in Tanzania, and to what degree does culture and 
knowledge impact this process? 
This thesis will discuss networking through a narrative empirical presentation of two foreign 
entrepreneurs’ entrepreneurial process. This thesis has a basis in an in- depth case study of a 
business created by two Norwegian entrepreneurs in Tanzania. In conclusion, the overall 
significance of this thesis is to generate knowledge on how foreign entrepreneurs can use 
networking as a tool to achieve success in an unknown cultural context, and that international 
entrepreneurs who have a vision to start a small to medium sized businesses in Tanzania and 
make a life there, may find this thesis of use.  
This thesis is arranged in six chapters with relevant accompanying sub- chapters.  In the first 
chapter of this thesis, I have introduced the current thematic situation of Tanzania, as well as 
my research question.  
In the second chapter, the theoretical framework will be presented. The main focus will be on 
the terms: network, culture and knowledge, although it will also introduce entrepreneurship as 
a phenomenon as well as the impact of entrepreneurial activity on economic growth. 
In the third chapter, the methodology used to find this thesis’ empirical evidence will be 
introduced. Here the focus will be on qualitative research and the methods used to collect 
empirical data, and further, my critical reflections of, and ethical choices taken during my 
research process 
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In the fourth chapter, the empirical case study of Paka Adventures Ltd. will be presented as a 
narrative story to describe the entrepreneurial process with detail and give the reader a 
contextual understanding of different scenarios and situations in different stages of doing 
business in Tanzania, which will be discussed in the analysis. 
In the fifth chapter, an analysis of the case study with basis in the thesis’ theoretical 
framework will be presented. The analysis is divided in the following three main sub- 
chapters: 1) Starting a business, 2) Developing a business and 3) Expanding a business, which 
will aim to provide structure in regards to discussing the different stages of the entrepreneurial 
process of doing business in Tanzania. The analysis will discuss how two foreign 
entrepreneurs used networking throughout their entrepreneurial process, as well as the impact 
that culture and knowledge had, and still has. 
In the sixth chapter, a summary of this research’s findings will be summarized, and further 
research will be suggested. 
  
6 
 
  
7 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Some environments can be seen as more favorable to individuals who wish to start their own 
business, and according to Mitra (2012), the “different societies will display different codes 
and varieties of social conduct, which to some extent will reflect the stage of their economic 
development” (p.70). This statement is something that Spilling (2008) is also in agreement 
with. In in order to do a good analysis of an entrepreneurial process, it is important to 
understand how the entrepreneurial process takes place in such contexts. In this thesis, context 
will be understood as the correlation of cultural factors that may have an influence on the 
entrepreneurship process in any way, as I will further explain in sub- chapter 2.3. DeLong and 
Fahey (2000) states how the concepts of culture and knowledge are often used without any 
attempt to really define what it means in practice.  In the attempt of answering my research 
question I found it important to choose a practical theoretical framework that would be able to 
give a holistic understanding of networking during an entrepreneurial process. This includes 
theory that are able to explain networks and the use of networking to attract resources, theory 
to explain cultural influences on entrepreneurial activity, as well as theory of knowledge and 
its importance to growth and development of a business. 
The three terms; network, culture and knowledge, are interdependent in the discussion of the 
different stages of an entrepreneurial process, and they will be used to discuss and analyze my 
case study in chapter 5. In this chapter, I have decided to present the terms separately to be 
able to gain an in- depth understanding of each term. To provide a basis for the three terms in 
regards to their relation to the entrepreneurial term, I will first provide a short theoretical 
introduction of entrepreneurship, to understand the role of the entrepreneur as well as the 
entrepreneurial process.  
Spilling (2008) explains how the entrepreneurial term concerns the actor or actors that start a 
new financial activity. The entrepreneurship term regards the process from the moment an 
idea is born, until resources have become organized, and the result is a business generating 
economic activity. Entrepreneurs do not appear in a vacuum; rather they are closely connected 
with their surroundings. This includes the local business environment, political environment, 
social environment and family. Entrepreneurial processes will often come out as a reflection 
of, or be closely related to, the entrepreneurs’ different relationships towards such 
surroundings. In the decision process of creating a business, entrepreneurs can experience 
what has been called push and pull factors. Push factors are the external pressure the 
entrepreneurs face, where entrepreneurs are more or less forced by their situation to start a 
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business, due to for example a lack of employment and therefore in need of employment. Pull 
factors come from more positive circumstances, where an entrepreneur, for example, may see 
an opportunity in a market, or have an idea as well as the needed resources to start an own 
business venture.  
Creative destruction is a process that persistently revolutionizes the economic structure from 
within as entrepreneurs take part in altering and destroying industries and continually creates 
new ones. The term “creative destruction” was introduced by the Austrian economist Joseph 
Schumpeter in his work "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy" (1942) to explain how 
entrepreneurs could be seen as a source to create inventions that will lead to fundamental 
changes in technologies, products or processes. Entrepreneurship stems from the actions of an 
individual or a group of individuals which are embedded within the same project, firm or 
network. Entrepreneurship generates economic activity through activities with a basis in 
creating new products, new services and new ways of doing things according to Norn et al. 
(2011). The entrepreneurs are basically introducing new ways of doing things in which will 
keep changing the “rules of the game”. This process of creative destruction is what fuels long- 
term economic growth according to Schumpeter (1942). 
Norn et. Al (2011) states how entrepreneurial activities take place in an industry, a city, a 
region or even a country, and how multiple analyses must be taken into account to understand 
entrepreneurial behavior. The influence of culture on entrepreneurship can, according to Mitra 
(2012), be challenging, due to the relation that culture has to social responses of how people 
live and behave in a society. In every society there are different codes of social conduct. This 
can help shed light on the varieties of entrepreneurial activity in different cultures, which may 
be reflecting the stage of economic development of the society as well. Government policies 
are often a factor playing into the entrepreneurial culture in a society, as they often favor 
specific types of activity in the environment. In the period from 1950 to 1980, for example, 
most Western economies became focused on wealth and job creation, as well as innovation, 
and governments saw the development of large firms as the most important step to achieve 
these goals. Today, the emergence of new businesses is seen as important units of economic 
activity as well, and government policies are therefore aimed towards supporting both small 
and large firms. As Romer (1993) emphasized in regards to the importance of ideas in the 
growth process: “In a world with physical limits, it is discoveries of big ideas, together with 
the discovery of millions of little ideas that make persistent economic growth possible” (p. 
64).   
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There are different perspectives of entrepreneurship. According to Certo and Miller (2008), 
the term “commercial entrepreneurship” means the identification, evaluation and exploitation 
of opportunities resulting in profit. The term “social entrepreneurship” means the 
identification, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities that result in social value. In 
contrast to the commercial view on measuring value in profit, social entrepreneurs measure 
value in social needs that they creatively have managed to solve. Certo and Miller (2008) 
further go in to how a business or an organization may pursue a combination of both 
commercial and social entrepreneurship, becoming what has been called a “hybrid”. What is 
determined as a true hybrid, however, has proved to be difficult. For instance, the matter of 
cause- related marketing strategy, in which businesses may use to increase sales and profit. In 
other words; businesses may profit by marketing themselves to be social entrepreneurs, only 
to gain more profit. 
I have divided the rest of this chapter into the following three main sub- chapters: 
Network, including the importance of strong and weak ties, social capital, trust, social 
uncertainty and partner selection. 
Culture, including regional culture and the influence in which corruption has on 
entrepreneurial culture in a place. 
Knowledge, including the importance of tacit and explicit knowledge, knowledge reservoirs 
and security. 
2.1 Network 
Referring to Spilling (2008), networks are not something that is constant, but rather something 
that is continuous, as networks are constantly changing. Furthermore, the quality of a network 
is dependent on the time spent on developing it. It has to be a priority from the start of the 
development of a business if the goal of the task at hand is to be achieved.  In this sub- 
chapter the focus will be on why networking is important to attract resources. As well as how 
the different stages of an entrepreneurial process means a change in the use of networking to 
attract resources, skills and information, to help reduce uncertainty and further shape the 
direction of a business’ actions.  
According to Mitra (2012) the following three points give reason to why networking is 
important for entrepreneurs: 1) A business can find legitimacy in a network, protect their new 
products and services, and gain knowledge and attract investments, 2) entrepreneurs need to 
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know governance structures and have a network in systems and institutions to be able to 
establish themselves, and 3) the emergence of the internet has become an important part of 
networking, as the reliance on intellectual capital for creating new products and services is 
constantly increasing, and connects millions of people (entrepreneurs, users and others). 
According to Spilling (2008) networking, which is indirectly or direct social contact with 
individuals, groups or institutions, will give entrepreneurs the possibility to gain access to 
affective resources, informative resources, and material resources. Affective resources are 
resources of a social nature, including encouragement and support. Informative resources are 
resources which include advice about bureaucratic, technical and financial conditions which is 
essential to the planning of the business. Material resources are resources such as capital and 
labor which are assets that a business is dependent on. The access to these resources increases 
the further the business has come in the process from idea to establishment, or product launch 
to market. It is challenging to establish and maintain networks however, as it requires time 
and put a strain on resources. In addition, a company's needs change over time, and this may 
reduce the utility of the network. It is therefore important to be able to build a cognitive 
capacity so that the businesses are able to see themselves and their network from the outside. 
In other words, Spilling (2008) states that a start-up should make a strategic assessment of 
how they relate to their surroundings. 
Following the theory regarding network ties by Granovetter (1973), the quality of networks 
depends on strong and weak ties, which can be classified according to the amount of time, 
intimacy, emotional intensity as well as the reciprocal services involved. Strong ties are 
intense relations between individuals who offer great depth of knowledge although little 
knowledge diversity. Weak ties on the other hand, are weak relations with other groups or 
individuals that give more diverse knowledge and, according to Granovetter (1973), are more 
efficient than strong ties in regards to spreading information. Strong ties can be understood as 
an entrepreneur’s closest friends or family, and weak ties can be understood as acquaintances 
or other relations that entrepreneurs seek to gain new knowledge.  
Greve & Salaff (2003) states that contacts that interact with the entrepreneur on a frequent 
basis provide a big influence to an entrepreneur’s support group, they often expand and make 
opportunities available for the entrepreneur. These contacts are what was referred to as the 
entrepreneur’s social capital. I shortly wish to present Greve and Salaff’s (2003) as well as 
Madurapperuma’s (2011) studies on networking in different stages of business establishment, 
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to illustrate the effect of Granovetter’s (1973) strong and weak ties in different stages of the 
entrepreneurial process. These results will also be discussed and compared against my 
empirical data in the analysis of this thesis in chapter 5. 
Greve & Salaff (2003) identified social network activities and characteristics of 
entrepreneurial businesses using Wilken’s (1979) three- phase model in their research. This 
model consists of three phases, namely motivation, planning and establishment. The 
motivation phase is where the entrepreneurs explore their possibilities of starting a business, 
and where entrepreneurs often have a limited network of friends and family. The planning 
phase is where the focus is on the preparation and planning of starting a business. It is in this 
phase the entrepreneurs seek a larger social network to gain knowledge, resources, new skills 
and business relations. The establishment phase is in effect when the entrepreneurs have a 
running business, and they concentrate on maintaining a social network consisting of key 
persons that provide them with resources and commitment, often through the security of 
contracts. There is also a second part of the establishment phase, where the option of 
entrepreneurs taking over a business and its existing social network exists. I have chosen to 
exclude this however, because of its irrelevance to my case study analysis. 
In all of the three phases, entrepreneurs used their social capital to access resources, although 
each phase required a different emphasis on networking. The results of Greve & Salaff’s 
(2003) study offers a structural approach to understanding entrepreneurship by presenting 
how networking deems different in each of the three phases of business establishment. In the 
motivation phase, it became clear that the entrepreneurs needed a protected environment to 
talk and discuss any ideas of starting a business. The entrepreneurs therefore only opened up 
to their closest relations, their strong tie relations, such as family and friends. In the planning 
phase a greater degree of planning is necessary, which led to an expansion of the discussion 
networks of the entrepreneurs. In this phase it proved most important to use time and energy 
on building new relations and maintaining them, described as weak ties by Granovetter 
(1973). In the establishment phase, it became evident that the entrepreneurs focused on the 
most important members of their social network. These members may include both strong and 
weak tie relations, and Greve and Salaff (2003) found that this approach leads to less time 
spent on networking and further a reduction of the entrepreneur’s social network. 
Madurapperuma (2011) have done research on what impact social networks of entrepreneurs 
would have on the growth of their small businesses. This research is based on 101 
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entrepreneurs in small retail businesses. The aim was to explore differences and similarities in 
the entrepreneurs’ composition of social networks in various stages of venture development, 
and the entrepreneurial process was divided into the following three stages; the discovery 
stage, the start-up stage and the ongoing stage. The discovery stage included the close 
network around the entrepreneurs when discussing the idea of their businesses. The start-up 
stage included the network in the business establishing process. The ongoing stage included 
the network in the further growth, maturity and development or stagnation of the business. 
Madurapperuma’s (2011) research results states that family and friends are the key network 
members in the first stage of the entrepreneurial process, which is in accordance with Greve 
and Salaff’s (2003) research as well. Madurapperuma’s (2011) research did, however, also 
indicate an increase in the relative importance of non- family ties; or weak ties. This was due 
to the resources that the entrepreneurs knew would be needed in later stages. 
Madurapperuma’s (2011) first stage, both weak and strong tie relations deemed important. In 
the start-up stage facilities and financial capital were more pertinent. The networks extended 
to non- regular contacts, including business acquaintances, professionals and formal 
institutions. It can therefore be understood as a heightened focus on weak tie relations 
providing more diverse knowledge, according to the theory of Granovetter (1973), than what 
regular contacts, such as family and friends, would be able to provide. In the ongoing stage, 
Madurapperuma (2011) understood that the businesses gained access to complementary 
resources and competence. The main focus was on maintaining non- regular ties with 
professional services, professional bodies, and government agencies, which are weak tie 
relations. 
As described by the two examples above, the focus on strong tie relations, weak tie relations 
or both, differs throughout the entrepreneurial process. This is due to the different resources 
needed by the entrepreneurs in different stages. As with financial capital, Ladegård (2003) 
explains that also social capital entails doing investments in relation to future performance. 
Startup businesses often lack financial resources, market intelligence, and competence in 
accordance with laws, rules and financial management. Many of these resources are to be 
found and purchased in the market, but for startups with the lack of capital, it is not the 
solution. The business’ social capital, however, may help to replace the financial capital. The 
business must be able to create goodwill towards themselves with the others in their network, 
in the sense that people in their corporate network wants to give them something. The 
business must further have the competence to convert that goodwill to real services, and at the 
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same time make it easy for their contacts to transfer these potential resources. This leads us to 
the importance of trust in networks. 
Through identifying sources of social capital, Licht and Siegel (2008) have found the 
following four sources that describe different mechanisms by which social capital generates 
trust. First and foremost, when an individual identifies with a group from birth, leading to 
altruistic behavior towards the other members of the group, it is called value introjection. 
Second, the act of generosity towards members in a group, based on the notion of mutual 
support, is called reciprocity exchanges. Third, when a group of people share a common event 
or group of events during the lifetime of the group it is called bounded solidarity. Four, the 
punishment of a member of a group, on the reason of inappropriate behavior against the other 
members of the group, is called enforceable trust.   
The next sub- chapter will discuss how partner selection can give new knowledge and reduce 
uncertainty in a business and further explain how networking towards different actors in an 
environment can commence growth. 
2.1.1 Social Uncertainty and Partner Selection 
Solberg (2009) states how network can to some extent can be said to have the same function 
as information, as both serve as a purpose to reduce uncertainty in regards to decisions that 
are to be made by the business. Information is needed to make a good decision, at the same 
level, a network of players may provide a business with a variety of information that can 
contribute to make a good business decision. Essentially, one of the qualifiers is to be able to 
trust that the information received from the partners in the network is factual and true. It takes 
time to construct a network, and build the trust necessary for future collaboration. If a link in 
the network were to fail, trust issues will arise. Through these issues none of the parties will 
trust one another, and the possibility of using the network in the future is lost. Without trust, 
an entrepreneur will risk that a good project may not be realized as a result of insecurity and 
fear for opportunism. According to Reiersen (2013), if you trust others you expect that they 
will not exploit you and your cooperation to secure own profit or other winnings. This is the 
reason to why people risk putting assets and resources into projects that will realize winnings 
for themselves as well as for others and the community.  
Unreliable behavior, Yamagishi (2011) explain to be understood as someone who exploits an 
imperfect contract for their personal benefits. This type of behavior often leads to social 
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insecurity and further, to the desire and need of forming a network. Yamagishi (2011) 
emphasize this by saying: 
Formation of commitment relationship helps in reducing social uncertainty through 
enhanced predictability of the partner’s behavior due to accumulation of information 
about the partner. (…) Thus, people who face social uncertain situations often try to 
voluntary form commitment relationships in which they can feel safe. (2011: 50) 
Yamagishi (1994) defines social uncertainty to be something that exists when an actor is 
incapable of detecting the intentions of a partner with dishonest incentives. If a partner proves 
to be dishonest, the risk for the actor, in this case; the entrepreneur, is to be cheated and the 
loss of valuable resources needed in the business. Essentially, the most simple and available 
strategy of minimizing the risk of social uncertainty, is to form strong relations with specific 
partners. Granovetter’s (1973) theory on strong ties can therefore be seen as a source towards 
less social uncertainty, as it generates trust. If trust is absent, Reiersen (2013) explains that the 
size of control and contracts increase, and that transaction costs will become larger.  
A certain degree of social uncertainty is unavoidable if the entrepreneur wishes to gain 
knowledge, as well as profit. Yamagishi (1994) states that making a deal with an “outsider”, 
can be more profitable than the assured profit with an “insider”, or as Granovetter (1973) puts 
it; weak ties are a source to gain more diverse knowledge. Essentially, by engaging with 
“outsiders” it means to take a risk of being exploited. Therefore, in the search for outside 
opportunity, for instance when the entrepreneur wants to gain new knowledge from other 
actors in a community, it involves more social uncertainty. To seek new opportunities and 
new relations to other actors in a community includes taking risks, and this is a basic 
characteristic of an entrepreneur according to Spilling (2008).  
In regards to partner selection, Beckman et al. (2004) describes it as a fundamental driver of 
network stability and network change, thus making it a vital part of network theory. Forming 
new relationships with new partners can be seen as a form of exploration. Exploration can be 
explained as experimentation with different options, and in this case, forming new 
partnerships means the business expand their knowledge as well as expand their access to 
resources. Moreover, forming additional relationships with partners already connected to the 
business are described as exploitation. Exploitation includes refining and extending the 
knowledge that already exists in the business. 
15 
 
With what Beckman et al. (2004) refer to as firm-specific uncertainty, businesses can use the 
strategy of forming new relationships with new network partners, exploration, to achieve 
diversification of knowledge and legitimacy concerns. On one side, the exploration strategy 
can increase firm- specific uncertainty as little is known about how the new partner 
relationship will affect the business; it is a weak tie relation. On the other side the increase in 
new partner uncertainty gives the possibility of using new knowledge to reduce other firm- 
specific uncertainties.  
Market uncertainty is another “principle/term” that comes into play, when dealing with 
exploitation and networking. Beckman et al (2004) explains market uncertainty to be 
uncertainty affected by an entire industry or market, and which lies beyond the control of a 
single firm. According to Larsson (1992), uncertainty that arise outside of the businesses 
control can be reduced through exploitation of a business’ existing network. When a business 
is faced with market uncertainty, exploitation suggests maintaining current partners as the 
business is in need of stability and trust in inter-partner relationships, and not in need of 
seeking new uncertain relationships. In other words, through adding additional relationships 
stronger tie relations and deeper levels of trust will be established.  
One of the study results of Beckman et al (2004), found that firms did, as Larsson’s (1992) 
theory proved right in regards to firms reacting to market uncertainty, reinforce their existing 
network relationships when facing market uncertainty. When a firm maintained committed 
more to their present partners however, Beckman et al. (2004) found that firms would not 
experience reduction of any degree in the uncertainty they were facing. The exploitation 
strategy was nevertheless the adopted choice of most firms facing market uncertainty. 
What has been explained above can be connected  to what Vatne (2005) has called “untraded 
interdependencies”, which is a term used to understand how businesses focus on interactions 
with competitors and potential important alliances with other actors in a community to 
manage to control risk as well as connect different resources. This type of relations, due to its 
characteristics of tacit knowledge, which will be explained in chapter 2.3, requires personal 
dialogue. It can create new knowledge and provide the opportunity of achieving control of the 
businesses’ surroundings, generating the opportunity of strategic actions which may prove 
beneficial for a business. In the next sub- chapter I will present relevant theory on culture and 
discuss its influence on entrepreneurial activity. 
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2.2 Culture 
Defining culture is a tricky task, as a wide variety of scholars from the academic areas ranging 
from psychology to cross- cultural business management, have published countless 
definitions, both simple and complex, of culture. In the 1950’s, Kroeber et.al (1952) defined 
culture as “the historically differentiated and variable mass of customary ways of functioning 
of human societies” (p. 157). Hofstede (1991) states how values are acquired early in life and 
are enduring, but practices are learned in a later stage and can be altered. National cultural 
differences, he points out, is primarily composed of differences in values, and not as much of 
differences in practices. For the purpose of this thesis, I have defined culture as elements of 
behavior that can affect an entrepreneurial process. The elements of behavior include values, 
norms and practices which all may affect the process in terms of social uncertainty, corruption 
and unreliable behavior. By using this definition I will further discuss the impact of culture on 
the entrepreneurial process. 
Entrepreneurship can be seen as a collective process, and according to Borch and Førde 
(2011), the regional culture is made out of the interaction between the people in a place. The 
Finnish geographer, Anssi Paasi (1990/91), explains that there are three different parts made 
out to explain regional culture. The first part is the regions material culture, which is the 
nature and man- made artefacts included in technology, and that has been given meaning, 
becoming indicators to a cultural system. The sense of belonging is related to the material 
culture and the interaction the residents have with other residents in the region. The second 
part is culture as a human act, meaning that the entrepreneurial culture in a certain location, is 
a result of how people relate to their surroundings. The third part of explaining regional 
culture is presenting culture as an identity, which can be divided into two perspectives. The 
first perspective is the regions identity, which is maintained by economic, cultural and 
political organizations and institutions in the region. The second perspective is the resident’s 
regional consciousness on how they themselves experience the region and their role in it. 
Bolkesjø and Brun (2008) explain that economic activity in general would not be possible 
without culture and simultaneously; that culture would not be possible without economic 
activity. This is because of how the history and traditions, the environmental factors 
influencing upbringing, as well as the employment experiences of the people living in a 
region, are all important factors in the discovery of ideas leading to economic activity, as well 
as important for understanding the entrepreneurial culture in a region. Krishna (2013) states 
how high social capital, as defined in chapter 2.1, can enable communities to achieve common 
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goals through collective actions. For these actions to be efficient, the community also need 
capable agents; people with the right resources to achieve the goals of the community. In the 
rural villages people want economic growth just as much as the people living in the urban 
areas according to Krishna (2013), and they want to be included and also engage more 
actively with state and market, even if it means to abandon old traditions and ways of life.  
How a society encourage, embrace and practice entrepreneurship and simultaneously; how 
entrepreneurship will be affected by societal factors, can be interpreted as being part of a 
culture; a whole way of life, according to Hofstede (1980). To this extent, entrepreneurship 
can be seen as part of a shared system of values, beliefs, aspirations and ideas of a people.  
What has been named “socioculturalism” can, according to Wertsch (1998), explain both the 
relationship between human actions, as well as the cultural, institutional, and historical 
contexts in which this human action takes place. The sociocultural perspective therefore 
enhance how learning are situated and takes part in physical or social contexts, or as Dysthe 
(2001) writes; “knowledge is constructed through interaction and in a context” (p.42).  
2.2.1 Entrepreneurial culture and corruption  
The entrepreneurs learn most effectively through the judgments they have made on the basis 
of prior information, signals of their venture they receive, and the location of the venture 
within an industrial sector. As Mitra (2012) states, entrepreneurs in uncertain environments 
have to hope to reach entrepreneurial success and optimal value by using his or hers sets of 
instruments and functions through different sets of skills.  Through “learning by doing or 
learning by imitating” (p. 17), is how entrepreneurs learn, as well as through a set of 
heuristics. This learning is tacit, they learn as they go along, through the interaction and study 
of others. It is often a part of the processes and customs of their own organization, and a lot of 
it varies, under specific circumstances, based on who they are and what they do. 
In the presence of corruption, Anokihn and Schulze (2009) states that an entrepreneur faces 
risk of having others in his or hers network seeking to appropriate profits from the business. 
Corruption is defined by Todaro and Smith (2011) as “The appropriation of public resources 
for private profit and other private purposes through the use and abuse of official power or 
influence” (p.774.). Corruption is a form of stealing, and the rate of corruption is often 
measured to be a lot higher in developing countries than in developed countries. An improved 
governance, and especially absence of corruption, encourages the influx of investments and a 
general improvement in the speed of development, as opposed to bickering over wealth 
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distribution. To accelerate the process of development it is important to improve governance 
in all aspects, particularly reducing the level of corruption in the system. 
Anokihn and Schulze (2009) explain how relying on one- sided trust become a great risk for 
entrepreneurs in an entrepreneurial culture affected by a high level of corruption and absence 
of institutional trust. According to Rose-Ackerman (2001), one- sided trust means that an 
entrepreneur’s decision about a person is decided based on reputation, professional 
qualifications, or other information that can prove reliability. In general, trust is said to 
become the product of repeated interaction with others, and confidence in trustworthiness of a 
person increases the more positive experiences the entrepreneur have with a person, as also 
discussed in chapter 2.1. 
On the other hand, corruption seems to disappear from the calculations made by the 
entrepreneur, when it is controlled. In corrupt environments it does not seem to be a need for 
two parties to trust each other. One sided trust can be enough to motivate trade, if both parties 
tend to share the same values and the communication channels between them are efficient. 
Negative and positive information about the business, in regards to quality, are quickly 
signaled through these channels (Rose Ackerman, 2001). Trust can therefore be understood to 
be gained through interaction over a period of time. Assurance on the other hand, as 
Yamagishi (1994) agrees with as well, is gained through knowledge about the incentive 
structure surrounding a relationship. 
DeLong and Fahey (2000) have done a research on knowledge management initiatives that 
show how knowledge needs to be discussed in reference to a cultural context so it will not be 
misleading. The research discusses the influence of culture in a business, and how culture can 
be undersood as a factor that creates and adopts new knowledge. Through figure 1 below, 
DeLong and Fahey (2000) explain how cultural elements in a business consist of; practices, 
norms and values. Practices are a set of repetitive behavior. Norms are the rules of behavior in 
a business. Values are embedded behavior preferences regarding what a business aim for and 
how to reach it. The three terms are interrelated, as values shape both norms and practices. 
Norms are derived from values and norms shape specific practices. The culture in a group, or 
in a business, shapes what a business defines as useful, important or relevant knowledge, and 
this will directly influence what knowledge a business will focus on. In other words, culture 
shapes behaviors that create, share and use knowledge. 
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Figur 1: Elements of culture 
 
 
Source: Adapted from DeLong and Fahey (2000) 
To be able to understand how networking can be used to attract resources, I will in the next 
section present different types of knowledge, the concept of knowledge sharing and how good 
knowledge reservoirs can gain competitive advantage. 
2.3 Knowledge 
The main focus for this chapter is to present how competitive advantage for entrepreneurs can 
be reached through a business’s knowledge reservoir, and how knowledge sharing is vital for 
growth and development, in terms of codified and tacit knowledge. 
According to De Long & Fahey (2000), knowledge is said to be a product of human 
experience and reflection. Dependent on context, knowledge exists at individual and group 
level, or it is embedded in an organizational routine or process. Unlike other resources, Choo 
(1998) explains that knowledge has the interesting characteristics of getting enriched by being 
used, remaining with the knowledge holder even after giving it away to someone and existing 
independent of space and time. Furthermore, knowledge is either explicit or tacit. Explicit 
knowledge, for example, can be the knowledge to change a flat tire on a safari car (the 
knowledge is codified and embedded in formal rules, tools, and processes), and tacit 
knowledge can be to have a collective lunch as a solution to improve the collective culture of 
the garage team (the knowledge is what we know but cannot explain).  
De Long & Fahey (2000) present the following three distinct types of knowledge. First we 
have human knowledge, which is what the individual know or knows how to do as it is 
manifested in skill or expertise. For example, a tour operator need to have the skill to make an 
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all round trip for a customer, but also need to have the expertise to find and select a trip which 
will be a good match for a particular customer. This knowledge usually combines both tacit 
and explicit knowledge.  
Second, we have social or collective knowledge that occurs only within a group of people, or 
in relationships between individuals. For example, in a safari business the high performing 
members in a garage team responsible for fixing safari cars. A team that shares a certain 
collective knowledge that makes out to be more than the sum of the individual knowledge of 
the teams’ members. This shared knowledge by group members is largely tacit, and develops 
only as a result of the members working together and their ability to collaborate effectively. 
Third and lastly, we have structured knowledge, which is to be found in an organization’s 
systems, processes, tools and routines, and is explicit and rule- based knowledge.  Compared 
to the first two types of knowledge, structured knowledge is an organizational resource, 
meaning it exist independently of human knowers. For a safari company, such structured 
knowledge can be the routines in performing a safari game drive for their customers, or an 
internet communication system towards potential customers. 
2.3.1 Entrepreneurial Knowledge Reservoirs 
Widding (2007) presents the entrepreneurs’ and the business’ knowledge reservoirs, which is 
based on how managers, or in this case; entrepreneurs, build and acquire knowledge. Figure 2 
presents the knowledge system in relation to the interaction between explicit and tacit 
knowledge. 
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Figur 2: Knowledge system 
 
 
Source: Widding (2007: 194) 
The black square, which represents explicit knowledge, symbolize formality according to 
Widding (2007). In comparison, tacit knowledge is the shape of a circle with aim to 
symbolize the more personal and less unyielding knowledge. Together, the circle and the 
square represent the internal knowledge reservoir of a firm, which consists of the 
entrepreneurial team and the firms employees. The white oval shape is the semi- internal 
knowledge reservoir, which include owners (entrepreneurs) and board members, and 
influence both the tacit and explicit knowledge reservoir.  
To have and to keep knowledge is not enough if a business wish to gain a competitive 
advantage. According to Teece et al. (1997), a business needs to use its knowledge and it 
needs a dynamic capability to do so. Figure 3 will show the holistic approach of an 
entrepreneur’s four most important abilities, identified by Brush et al. (2001),  to construct a 
resource base which will give a competitive advantage. These are namely the ability to 1) 
identify resources, 2) attract resources, 3) exploit resources and 4) protect resources. 
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Figur 3: The process of gaining competitive advantage 
 
Source: Widding (2007: 195) 
Illustrated by the arrows in figure 3, we understand the process as a continuous process.  The 
speed is influenced by the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge and it will be a 
factor that can give information on the firm’s ability to carry out the process. 
According to Dollinger (1999), the entrepreneurial process includes how the entrepreneurs 
acquire and develop knowledge resources. The new venture’s outcome is largely determined 
by the nature of the resources that the entrepreneurs are able to acquire. The awareness of the 
importance of knowledge in sustaining and enhancing a business’ competitiveness makes the 
acquisition of new knowledge a top managerial priority. This activity can be described as 
building “knowledge reservoirs”. 
Widding (2007) explains how there is always a risk when opening for interaction with 
external sources, which is in agreement with Yamagishi (1994) as mentioned in chapter 2.1.1. 
Competitors will have access to the business’ unique knowledge reservoir, and through this, 
the business will lose competitive advantage. By not taking the risk however, the business 
will lose the chance to develop their own significant knowledge resources, as the business’ 
chance to absorb knowledge is through soaking up knowledge from the environment. A 
business needs to absorb knowledge from its surroundings and at the same time control the 
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knowledge going to its competitors, or other actors in their network. In figure 4 this is 
illustrated with a gate.  
Figur 4: Gate keeping 
 
Source: Widding (2007: 196) 
Through “gate keeping”, Widding (2007) explains that the firm will, next to gaining 
knowledge from the surroundings, manage to control the direct knowledge that goes to the 
competitors, as well as they can protect specific knowledge essential to the firm. 
Widding (2007) has illustrated the firm in three different phases with three different 
competitive advantage levels and also with three different knowledge reservoir sizes and three 
different numbers of gates. This depicts competitive advantage by entrepreneurial knowledge 
management and sustainable competitive advantage. With competitive advantage representing 
the Y- axis, and time representing the x- axis we get the following graph in figure 5: 
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Figur 5: Competitive advantage through an entrepreneurial process 
 
 
In phase 1, down to the left in figure 5, the new established business is presented with a low 
degree of competitive advantage due to the low knowledge reservoir (internal, external and 
semi- internal knowledge). The business also has tacit knowledge which is greater than 
explicit knowledge, because of the lack of the businesses routines, specifications and task 
descriptions due to it being a young business. Only one gate is open for external environment, 
meaning relative little knowledge pass in or out of the business, which can bankrupt the 
business without taking measures to improve. 
In phase 2, in the middle of figure 5, the businesses competitive advantage has had some 
growth. The entrepreneur is assumed to have started the process of identifying necessary 
knowledge and has attracted and exploited this knowledge to go forward with mechanisms 
that will protect the firm’s knowledge reservoir. The growth is a result of these processes and 
the firm has opened more “gates” which has a positive effect on the flow of knowledge 
between the reservoirs. 
In phase 3, the right side of figure 5, the processes have been further developed. The business 
experience breeds higher competitive advantage. The explicit knowledge has also increased, 
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as the management wish is to reduce any risk that will follow if an employee choose to leave 
the firm. 
In the following method chapter I will introduce how I have gained my empirical data, reflect 
on different contextual factors that affected my study and discuss my critical reflection of my 
data. In chapter 3 I will present this thesis’s narrative case study through a similar structure of 
an entrepreneurial process in which have been presented in this chapter through Widding 
(2007). In this way I will be able to discuss how networking is based on knowledge as a 
resource to be shared, absorbed and protected throughout the stages from idea generation to 
growth, as well as discuss the influence of culture on knowledge and networks, in the analysis 
in chapter 5.   
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3. Choice of Methodology 
Research on entrepreneurship means to research individuals, businesses or any activity that 
generates innovation and economic growth, and this process, according to Audretsch (2003), 
can be very complex to explain and understand, as entrepreneurship is a multilayered 
phenomenon. Susan Smith (2001) writes how it is «usual to suggest that qualitative methods 
are a useful way of proceeding when we are interested in a multiplicity of meanings, 
representations and practices” (s. 24). The aim of my research is to analyze the story of an 
entrepreneurial process carried out by two foreign entrepreneurs in Tanzania. By doing so, I 
hope to contribute to the understanding of being a foreign entrepreneur in Tanzania, and to 
encourage comparison, reflection and new stories about foreign entrepreneurs and the role of 
networking in unknown cultural contexts.  
The focus of qualitative methods is the recognition of the human perspective in their everyday 
life according to Smith (2001). Furthermore, Steyaert (2004) argues that people’s everyday 
life is the stage where social change takes place, and through a narrative research the 
everyday life of entrepreneurship will open up. Boje (2008) look at narratives as a linear 
story, including a beginning, a middle and an end, which reverse earlier events to become our 
experiences, in order to achieve credibility by connecting the events. He also views narratives 
as something that is created. It thereby differs from the lived story that steadily passes, and he 
states how ”stories are more about dispersion of events in the present or anticipated to be 
achievable in the future” (Boje, 2008. p. 4).  
Different stories are told in different places and can’t be described as classical narratives. In a 
business, different stories are continuously told in different places of the business. Schank 
(2000) states how narratives, storytelling, knowledge and communication are connected. He 
points out how we learn from what happens to us, and this knowledge will be a part of 
controlling our actions, as well as what we tell others. Knowledge comes from stories, as we 
remember stories and pass them on to others. As a researcher, my aim was to gather and 
interpret knowledge from the entrepreneurs of a business, and their network throughout an 
entrepreneurial process. As Foss (2010) argues; a narrative approach can give a better 
understanding of entrepreneurs’ networks and networking skills. Therefore, in accordance 
with Borch and Førde (2010), taking a narrative approach where the entrepreneurs’ stories are 
in focus, creativity becomes a part of the knowledge production as the entrepreneurial process 
demands interpretative and contextualized research of many voices. In this chapter, chapter 3, 
I will explain how I have gathered the stories written in this thesis. In chapter 4, I will present 
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my interpretation of the stories in an organized manner, which will give the stories meaning. 
In chapter 5, I will analyze the stories by using the theoretical framework presented in chapter 
2, and make the stories available and the meaning legible, as well as negotiable, for others.  
I chose the qualitative methods; in- depth interviews and observation, to be able to do a 
“multi- cited Ethnographic case study”, which I will present in the next sub- chapter together 
with an overview of my fields of study. In this chapter I will discuss my use of interviews and 
observation, before I will reflect critically upon my research in regards to reliability, 
positionality, limitations, validity and ethical aspects, using my own experiences as examples.  
3.1. Multi- Cited Ethnographic Case Study 
I have called my research for a multi- cited ethnographic case study, in the attempt to properly 
explain my actions during the research process. My research is ethnographic as it consists of 
the gathering of rich and nuanced data through the use of daily interaction with research 
participants for a period of two months, which is in accordance with Crang and Cook’s (2007) 
theory on ethnography. Falzon (2009) explains how being in different spheres of social 
relations, is something that multi- cited ethnography aims to expand upon, where the people 
and their associations are the field of study. Essentially, it dictates that the use of this method 
can be accomplished physically or conceptually. Physically, the researcher moves to several 
places and resides there for a short while, instead of spending months in a single location. The 
same goal can also be achieved conceptually, by using two sets of data and contrasting them 
against each other.  
I have chosen to perform multi- cited ethnography research, as I needed to follow the network 
of a business. By travelling to places where I could physically meet informants, I gained the 
opportunity to collect data from more than one location and source of information. Through 
meeting and interviewing key individuals in my informants’ network, I managed to gather 
more contextualized and rich information, as well as I was able to ensure a case study based 
on quality data. Yin (2014) explains that a case study is an empirical inquiry that will give a 
researcher the focus on one or more cases and give a holistic perspective of a case. As my 
research question has basis in understanding an entrepreneurial process performed by foreign 
entrepreneurs, and their use of networks in a unknown culture, it became clear that in order to 
produce the data necessary to create such an understanding, I needed to spend a lot of time 
with one business . During my empirical inquiry of an entrepreneurial process; from the 
business idea generating stage and up to a business’ current stage of growth and development, 
29 
 
I understood my need of in- depth data, which is a time consuming process. My reason for 
choosing to go with only one case study is therefore based on the high amount of data 
collected, and the time spent with one business to collect this data. 
Through contacting Eivind Fjeldstad, the managing director of the Norwegian- African 
Business Association (NABA), I gained insight of large Norwegian businesses that recently 
have made big investments in Tanzania. My interest however, was to research an 
entrepreneurial process of a small, to medium, sized business. I therefore decided to contact 
four Norwegian businesses in Tanzania, which the Norwegian embassy in Dar Es Salaam had 
listed on their websites as. Of these four, two responded, and I met with both of them. Paka 
Adventures, which is a medium sized business stationed in Dar Es Salaam, and Wild Tracks, 
which is a small sized business stationed in Arusha. Both businesses specialize in safari tours, 
and early in the interview process with Paka Adventures, I was told that these two businesses 
were collaborating on a business level. As Paka Adventures owned a beach resort as well as 
running a safari business, and due to the amount of information I gained early in the process, I 
decided my thesis would benefit if I used this business as my case study. Since Wild Tracks 
was part of the Paka Adventures’s network, I chose to travel to Arusha to interview the 
Norwegian founder of this business. I will further give an overview of the different places I 
travelled to gain information during my research process. 
3.1.1. Fields of Study 
The main reason for choosing Tanzania as the country for doing my research, comes from my 
experience of doing volunteer work in this country since 2010 and of my interest in exploring 
entrepreneurship in a third- world country. As mentioned in chapter 1, Tanzania is a country 
enduring rapid growth, which is currently attracting a lot of attention from investors all over 
the world. I aim to understand how Norwegian entrepreneurs are able to build up a business in 
a business culture that differs from the westernized business culture in Norway. My case 
study includes qualitative research from Dar Es Salaam, Kigamboni and Arusha in Tanzania 
as well as from Oslo in Norway.   
The map below shows the areas in the Dar Es Salaam region where I conducted most of my 
fieldwork. Mbezi Beach is the place where Paka Adventures’ main office is located, and 
where I had most of my interviews with the two Norwegian entrepreneurs behind the 
business, as well as with some members of their business. Paka Adventures also owns and 
runs “The Lighthouse Beach Resort”, approximately 40 kilometers south of Kigamboni, also 
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marked on the map below.  Here I performed several interviews with staff, as well as I made 
observations, during a four day stay. The picture below shows the Dar Es Salaam harbor, and 
it was taken when I was on my way back from Kigamboni by ferry. 
 
Figur 6: Dar Es Salaam  
Source: https://www.google.co.uk/maps/, Picture: Private photo 
To be able to meet and interview the entrepreneurs behind Wild Tracks, I travelled nine hours 
with bus from Dar Es Salaam to Arusha, as marked on the map below. For two days I stayed 
in the home of the entrepreneurs behind Wild Tracks, the entrepreneurs being Frank, who is 
Tanzanian, and Beate, who is Norwegian. I conducted four interviews with Beate regarding 
their safari business and the collaboration they had with Paka Adventures. I was also 
introduced to their local work of coffee farmers. The picture below is of one of their two 
safari cars, showing the Wild Tracks business logo. 
 
Figur 7: Arusha 
Source: https://www.google.co.uk/maps/, Picture: Private photo  
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After my fieldwork in Tanzania ended, I went back to Norway. There, I was able to meet with 
the entrepreneurs behind Paka Adventures Ltd in Oslo during the annual travel fair in January. 
I spent two days helping them with their stand, as well as interviewing them in-between work. 
I experienced how the Norwegian entrepreneurs marketed themselves through participant 
observation, and had conversations with them, and their two Norwegian interns. The picture 
shows an overview of the travel fair in Telenor Arena. 
 
Figur 8: Oslo 
Source: https://www.google.co.uk/maps/, Picture: Private photo  
By moving and changing locations, I have experienced different places, and interacted with 
different actors connected to the business. I have according to Takenaka (2007) managed to 
access data which otherwise would have been unavailable to me. 
Next to the many interviews with the members of staff, my main bulk of produced data comes 
from multiple in- depth interviews with the two Norwegian entrepreneurs behind the business 
Paka Adventures. I also practiced observation and participatory observation in order to gain 
information on relational behavior, as well as atmosphere, which according to Crang & Cook 
(2009) is information that can only be collected through observing the participants in their set 
element. In the following sub- chapters I will present the two methods used during my multi- 
cited ethnographical case study; interviews and observation.  
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3.2 Interviews  
According to Smith (2001) qualitative interviews allow for documentation of people’s 
experiences and stories which the researcher interpret, analyze and give meaning. Valentine 
(2001) states that the result of using interviews are dependent on the skills of the interviewer. 
Without being able to listen and create good relations towards the interviewee, there is a good 
chance that the interviewer will not manage to get good information. It is also important that 
the questions asked, need to be understood by the interviewee, as well as they should not put 
the interviewee in an uncomfortable situation. Yin (2014) also agrees with this, when 
explaining how case study interviews require that the interviewer operate on two levels at the 
same time: 1) satisfying the needs of your line of inquiry, and 2) putting forth “friendly” and 
“nonthreatening” questions in your open ended interviews. 
My goal has been to share the subjective view of my informants, and my task has accordingly 
been objective, as I have tried to describe in depth and detail the subjective views of the 
research subjects. By doing so, I have represented the person’s view fairly and portrayed it as 
consistent with their meanings according to Silverman (2011). In every interview I made sure 
to use an informal approach and often engaged in conversation and discussion, rather than 
keeping a strict question and answer routine. By having the opportunity to come back for new 
interviews with my main informants gave me time to prepare for further inquiry on matters 
that I felt was important for my research. 
Following the theory of Crang and Cook (2009), there are several ways to hold an interview, 
and they present the following three ways. First, the interview can be structured were the 
researcher ask specific questions which the informant answers. Second, the interview can be 
semi-structured where the questions are more of a guide for the researcher as well as it allows 
the researcher to be more spontaneous in addressing and adding questions on interesting 
topics. Third, an interview can be open, where some chosen topics are set up for conversation 
and discussion between researcher and researched. The main difference between structured, 
semi- structured and open interview guides are, according to Crang and Cook (2009), the 
level of data comparison during analysis. With structured interviews, the researcher asks the 
same questions to different informants and can easily compare the answers. In an open 
interview, the comparison is close to impossible as the questions are more spontaneous and 
never the same with all informants.  
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During my research I used mainly semi- structured and open interviews, which gave me the 
advantage of asking follow up questions on topics of particular interest to me. It also helped 
me keep organized, by making it easy to get back on track if the interview went off topic. 
Since language barriers and the level of education on some of the staff I interviewed proved to 
be more challenging than first expected, my use of open interviews became valuable. I needed 
to be able to form questions based on how they understood the topics I wanted to talk about. 
The interviews therefore became more like a conversation, where the interviewees told me 
about their experiences on their own terms. In appendix 1, the semi- structured interview 
guide which I used when interviewing the entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures and the English 
speaking key members of the business is attached. In appendix 2 the open interview guide 
which I mainly used with uneducated members of staff is attached.  
During in- depth interviews that lasted for more than one hour I used a tape recorder, which 
Tjora (2010) states gives the researcher the benefit of being able to cite direct quotes uttered 
by informants during the interview. This will also strengthen the validity of my research, as 
the information is the informants “voice”, and not altered by me. Using a tape recorder made 
it easier to transcribe the interviews afterwards in great detail as well. The tape recorder 
became especially valuable during time consuming interviews, as I never feared to miss out 
on valuable information. Especially in contrast to only taking notes, as it is close to 
impossible, according to Thaagard (2009), to write everything down during an interview. 
When conducting interviews in a second or third language it is, according to Crang and Cook 
(2009),  important to understand that almost any utterance in any language carries a set of 
assumptions, feelings and values, and that both researcher and researched bring their own sets 
of assumptions, feelings and values on different matters. This makes room for a lot of 
misinterpretation, especially if a translator, as a third party, is also taking part in the interview 
process. In Tanzania the official language is Kiswahili, and due to my scarce knowledge of 
the language I needed a translator when interviewing non English speaking local staff. As 
presented in figure 9, Dzene was my translator when interviewing staff working at the Paka 
Adventures’ office, and Bridgette and Frank were my translators when interviewing the staff 
working at The Lighthouse Beach Resort. Their help interpreting became very valuable for 
my data collection. Confusion about the level of English the staff had did cause some 
challenges during my research. In retrospect I should have done more preparations finding out 
what level of English my informants had. 
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To illustrate an example; I was ready to interview Mpenda, one of the key people who had 
been a part of the resort from the very beginning. I did not expect that Mpenda did not speak 
English, as I felt his position implied that his English would be good, due to his high status 
and role in the development of Paka Adventures, and The Lighthouse Beach Resort. I planned 
the interview through Bridgette, the hotel manager, and when he arrived we sat down and I 
introduced myself and my research. It started off well, where I presented myself and my 
research followed by him wanting to read my interview guide. Mpenda looked with fair 
amount of interest at the guide, nodding and uttering the word “okey” several times. I did not 
know what I could do except letting him take his time before I could start asking him 
questions. Then, all of a sudden he wanted me to follow him around the resort. Proudly he 
pointed to the view, the buildings and the restaurant, while enthusiastically explaining in 
detail when and how he had participated in all of the building processes. It was very pleasant, 
except he was not speaking a word English. With my poor understanding of Kiswahili and 
hand gesticulation, we somehow communicated for more than 15 minutes, although it was not 
related to my research questions at all. When the conversation came to an end, I was lucky to 
find and ask Bridgette if she could serve as our translator, as I had assumed wrongly of his 
ability to speak English. The interview did not turn out how I had wished, as Bridgette knew 
Kiswahili as a second language and had some struggles translating. Nevertheless, in 
conclusion; the information I gained from the interview did validate a lot of information I had 
heard from other informants and therefore became valuable data, even though it was 
challenging. 
The interviews I had with the two entrepreneurs behind Paka Adventures, as well as the 
founder of Wild Tracks, were all in Norwegian, and therefore the room for misinterpretation 
was much smaller. I will further present an overview of the informants I interviewed during 
my research. 
3.2.1 Informants 
So that I would be able to understand the entrepreneurial process of Paka Adventures, it was 
important for me to talk to members of staff that had been working with Paka Adventures 
from the beginning, as well as relatively newly employed members. I have interviewed seven 
of Paka Adventures’ staff, who was recognized as key- persons by the entrepreneurs behind 
the business. Below I have provided an overview of people I have interviewed, stating what 
role they had in the business, and where and for what duration I interviewed them.  
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Figur 9: List of informants 
Name(s) Role Interview Location 
Helene Tungland 
Eivind Tungland 
Owners and founders of 
Paka Adventures 
7 interviews, each 
lasting from one to 
three hours. 
Paka Adventures’s office, 
Mbezi Beach, travel fair in 
Oslo and video 
conferences. 
Frank Fredrik Mbelwa Co- founder, part owner One interview lasting 
over two hours 
The Lighthouse Beach 
Resort 
Dzene Asangama Head of office next to 
Helene 
Two interviews. The 
first ap. 20 minutes, the 
other ap. two hours. 
Paka Adventures’s office. 
 
Ernest Shindano Safari guide and driver Two interviews lasting 
two hours and one 
conversation lasting 
one hour  
During a car trip from 
Kigamboni to Mlimani 
Bridgette Rieber Hotel manager at The 
Lighthouse Beach Resort 
One interview lasting 
one hour 
The Lighthouse Beach 
Resort 
Yusuf Mpenda Key person from the 
establishment stage 
One interview lasting 
one hour with 
Bridgette functioning 
as a translator 
The Lighthouse Beach 
Resort 
Khadija Mtumbi Head of cleaning staff at The 
Lighthouse Beach Resort, 
key person from the 
establishment stage 
One interview lasting 
30 minutes with Frank 
functioning as a 
translator 
The Lighthouse Beach 
Resort 
Augustin Nfowi 
 
Key persons from the 
beginning, Technician.  
One interview lasting 
30 minutes with Dzene 
functioning as a 
translator 
Paka Adventures’s office.  
Yustina Steven Key person from the 
beginning. Chef at the office 
of Paka Adventures 
One interview lasting 
30 minutes with Dzene 
functioning as a 
translator 
Paka Adventures’s office 
Beate Hustad Aamodt Founder and owner of Wild 
Tracks.  
Three interviews, one 
hour each over a two 
day duration. 
Wild Track’s office in 
Arusha 
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I met and observed almost all of the other members of staff, as well as participated in different 
business contexts, which would both ensure me good quality data and make me comprehend 
the surroundings and context that makes out the business. In the next sub- chapter I will 
further explain how I used and carried out the method of observation. 
3.3 Observation 
According to Kitchin & Tate (2000), two different types of observation may be presented; 
straight observation and participant observation. By employing the method of straight 
observation, the observer (or researcher) is visible although not participating in the observed 
activity. By employing the method of participant on the other hand, the researcher takes part 
in the activity and interacts with the people observed. Both methods of observation can be 
open, which means that the observed are aware of your reason and purpose of attending their 
activity, or they can be covered, which means the observed are not aware of the reason for 
your presence and attendance .  
By visiting The Lighthouse Beach Resort I was able to observe the staff when they were 
working, as well as take part in informal conversations with them. I was there first and 
foremost as a researcher, and I introduced myself and my reason for the visit, as I had made 
plans for doing interviews with many of them. This gave me the opportunity to openly take 
pictures and ask people questions relevant to my research.  
On the other hand I was also a paying customer. By having this role I had the opportunity to 
experience and observe the resort from a customer point of view, thereby getting a good sense 
of the atmosphere made by the uneducated local staff employed from the nearby village. 
Gaining rich descriptions and details about people in their everyday context, is the benefit of 
using observation as a method according to Valentine (2001). I believe it would have been 
difficult to gain information about the atmosphere at The Lighthouse Beach Hotel through the 
use of interviews alone. To give an example; one night, during dinner in the restaurant, a big 
beetle flew into my lap and probably wanted to share my food. Obviously I jumped in surprise 
and let the beetle take my chair. As I stood there, dumbfounded, three staff members came 
running to my “rescue” and chased the beetle away. This episode led to a lot of laughs, and I 
was invited to eat the rest of my dinner in their company. The interaction between the staff 
members and their interaction towards me I quickly picked up as unusual for beach resort 
employees. They made me feel like a part of their group or “family”. This experienced 
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observation made me understand the philosophy of The Lighthouse Beach Resort: “your 
home away from home”, and that the atmosphere created by the staff is non-imitable. 
When I visited the travel fare in Oslo in January I was able to observe as well as participate in 
marketing Paka Adventures from their stand. The first day I spent observing the interaction 
between the two Norwegian entrepreneurs and their potential customers.  The second day I 
got to participate by talking about my own experiences from my stay at The Lighthouse 
Beach Resort as well as answering potential customers’ general questions about Tanzania. 
Valentine (2001) states that in the case of participant observation, a researcher will be given 
the possibility to widen his or her insight into a community and its inter- human relations. 
During my participant observation, I learned how the entrepreneurs in my case study 
presented their business to potential customers. How they marketed their services through 
people’s need for security during holidays, by letting the potential customers know that they 
would meet them in Tanzania as they live there permanently. Compared to the stands close 
by, who were also marketing for tourism activities in Tanzania, Paka Adventures where the 
only stand offering this personal sense of security.  
In the following sub- chapters I will reflect critically on my research’s reliability, my position 
as a researcher, the validity of my research, different limitations, as well as reasons for 
anonymizing and other ethical choices throughout my research process. 
3.4 Critical Reflection Process 
Dowling (2000) explains critical reflexivity to be the critical reflections of a researchers own 
experiences and situations when doing research, and that the researcher constantly needs to 
reflect on how the fieldwork data has been affected, both in regards to positive and negative 
situations.  
When creating my research design I planned the duration of my fieldwork in Tanzania to be 
three months. Due to own health reasons however, I had to cancel my last month of research 
in Tanzania and travel back to Norway. The abrupt leave from doing fieldwork in Tanzania 
forced me to change my plans to be able to finish my data collection. Thagaard (2009) 
explains how spontaneity is an important aspect of being a researcher, as the researcher often 
needs to adapt to new situations during their research process. As my situation as a researcher 
changed, I needed to change my approach to produce data material. The relationships I had 
built with the two entrepreneurs of my case study during my fieldwork in Tanzania would 
deem very important for my ability to finish my research. 
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When I interacted with my two main informants, the entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures, 
through interviews and observation, I gained their trust. Falzon (2009) writes how the 
interaction between researchers and researched creates a basis for developing trust. Through 
this trust, and the use of my methods, I managed to ensure honest data, also after my return to 
Norway. Without the trust between my main informants and myself, my research would have 
been incomplete due to the unexpected reduction of time doing fieldwork in Tanzania. In the 
matter of reflexivity, this shows how important the positionality of a researcher is, which will 
be further discussed in chapter 3.4.1.   
Through skype interviews and continuous e-mail correspondence in the time period from 
November 2013 until June 2014, I found myself producing data of an ongoing development 
process in the Paka Adventures business. If I had finished my fieldwork in Tanzania in 
December 2013, this information might never even have been presented to me. My research 
process can therefore be described as flexible and spontaneous, as I have been able to 
discover new ideas along the way and produce, interpret and analyze empirical data in a 
parallel manner throughout the process. 
I will further discuss the terms reliability and positionality in the following sub- chapter.  
3.4.1 Reliability and Positionality 
To discuss my own position as a researcher I will present to examples from my fieldwork. 
According to Tjora (2010), a decisive factor in strengthening a research’s reliability is to 
present the context of the research. This means it is central to give account for the relational 
connection between myself as the researcher and my informants. Moser (2008) points out 
how it is important include focus on how for instance race, religion and class may impact the 
interaction between the researcher and the researched. As well as how it is important to reflect 
on the social skills and emotional abilities that is different for all individuals, in all social 
encounters.  
The first example is based on my first meeting I had with the two Norwegian entrepreneurs. I 
was invited to their home, and was presented to their two children. Their son quickly found 
his way onto my lap and seemed very happy to see me. A little surprised, I started playing 
with him, and his mother expressed to me: “I believe my son think you are his aunt or another 
relative, he is usually a bit shyer”. Sharing a Norwegian identity with my main informants 
became a valuable factor for my research, as the informants seemed to trust me and my 
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intentions of my research from the start. I was welcomed to ask any questions, and not far into 
the research process, I was let in on more sensitive details about their business.  
The second example is based on my experience on how being self- reflective about my 
positionality when being in the field is very important for producing good empirical data. 
When I arrived at The Lighthouse Beach Resort in Kigamboni, I was booked in as a guest, 
although I would not be the typical guest enjoying a holiday. I was there as a researcher, and I 
was from Norway just like the owners of the resort. With Frank as my translator I had 
scheduled to interview the manager of the cleaning service at the resort. I asked her questions, 
but she would barely look at me, and only smiled shyly before looking away in silence. I felt 
no engagement or interest from her, and after some time Frank took the liberty to answer the 
questions for her. Not only did I quickly understand that it was too difficult to translate and 
explain words like “establishment”, “development”, “network and relations” to an interviewee 
with no or little education.  I also understood that I had to change my role amongst the local 
staff to become less of an authority figure and less intimidating if I wanted better results, or in 
the case with the manager of the cleaning service, any valid answers at all. This self-
reflexivity made me realize that I had to find a way to step out from the scary researcher role I 
had come into when entering the resort with pen and paper, sharply dressed and eager to talk 
to everyone. Therefore, I chose to put on colorful beach clothes, placed myself in the bar like 
any “normal” guest would do and started conversing with the staff using my simple Kiswahili 
knowledge. This time around, I took mental notes instead of writing things down.  
These two examples show how I had two very different roles. My positionality when meeting 
my Norwegian informants was based on our shared Norwegian identity. As Crang & Cook 
(2007) points out, there is no easy way to either know how an individual’s identity will affect 
social contexts, or to find a common ground to work out from when doing research. My 
Norwegian identity gave me the benefit of being easily trusted, which again led me to be 
welcomed to research any part of the business. In contrast, my positionality when meeting the 
local staff at The Lighthouse Beach Resort seemed to be more based on the staff’s uncertainty 
of my intentions, maybe because of my “formal” presentation as a researcher, compared to 
that of being an “informal” guest.  
Tjora (2010) further states, in regards to reliability, how it is important to report what the 
possibility would be for other researchers to collect close to the same results. In this regard, I 
would often hear close to the same stories about different occurrences from different members 
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of Paka Adventures. In addition, interviewing the Norwegian founder, Beate, of Wild Tracks 
would give me information about similar experiences of corrupt activity when starting a 
business. This might be a factor to prove reliability, in the sense that other researchers may 
hear similar stories if doing qualitative research on Paka Adventures. The theoretical evidence 
regarding the environmental factors affecting the entrepreneurial culture in Tanzania, as 
presented in chapter 1, may provide a contextual basis for understanding the reliability of the 
empirical findings presented as a narrative in chapter 4. Fundamentally, the stories that have 
shaped the narrative case study in this thesis are too specific to be generalized.  
In the next sub- chapter I will discuss the validity of my research as well as reflect on 
limitations that can have affected this thesis.  
3.4.2 Validity and Limitations 
By discussing my case study narrative with my main informants I have ensured to make 
corrections throughout the process, which have enhanced the validity of the information 
produced during my research. Yin (2014) states that “a major way of improving the quality of 
case studies and ensuring their construct validity is to have the draft cases reviewed by those 
who have been the subjects of study” (p. 198). Furthermore, by talking to all of the key- 
members of Paka Adventures whom have taken part in the business from the beginning, I 
have validated many of the stories and experiences told to me by my two main informants. In 
the sake of cultural challenges, the Norwegian founder of Wild Tracks would also validate 
similar challenges in the establishment of her business, giving the stories of the two 
Norwegian founders of Paka Adventures grounds for credibility as well. 
Mohammad (2001) states that “given the complexity of researcher’s and researched’s 
identities and the dynamism of the research field, truth claims can be grounded only in real 
recognition of the limitations of vision and knowledge and existence of multiple truths”( p. 
113). An author needs to recognize the most valuable truth among many “truths”, and at the 
same time also understand his or her lack in absolute control over language, representation 
and meaning, as anyone who reads the author’s work may change the meaning, or agree or 
disagree about the meaning presented through empirical evidence based on multiple truths 
(Mohammad 2001).The quality of information I gathered from interviewing some of the staff 
members with little to no knowledge of English, and had little interest in my research, I 
deemed to not be good enough to be used as solid points for discussion in this thesis. It has 
therefore been left out of my empirical data. An example of this is the interview with the 
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manager of the cleaning service at The Lighthouse Beach Resort, as presented in an example 
in chapter 3.4.1. The observational data I collected during the “in-valid” interviews however, 
still proved to be important for me as a researcher as they gave me a holistic understanding of 
the business, the environment and the relationship between the staff. This gave me an edge 
when writing the narrative empirical presentation in the case study in chapter 4. 
The process of anonymity can be understood as a limitation as, according to Yin (2014), some 
aspects of information that may be important to the case study will be eliminated. In the next 
sub- chapter I will discuss my ethical approach during the research process as well as my 
choices for anonymizing informants and eliminating some of my produced empirical data in 
the matter of being ethically responsible.  
3.5 Ethical Approach and Anonymizing 
Dowling (2000) states that “..research is a dynamic and ongoing social process that constantly 
throws up new relations and issues that require constant attention, self- critical awareness of 
ethical research conduct..” (p. 28). When performing my research I conducted myself in an 
ethically responsible manner which included protecting those involved in my research, as well 
as the places where I chose to do my research. To make sure of this, I always ensured that all 
research participants were aware of what I was doing and why, and they were all given the 
choice of anonymity which is in accordance with the theory of Dowling (2000).  My choice of 
anonymizing some people’s names in my narrative by giving them pseudonyms is based on 
my lack of consent to use their full names. These people are part of a story told by my 
consented informants, and therefore has not been given a choice to participate in this thesis 
with full names. By using pseudonyms, I have been able to be ethically responsible, in the 
sense that I have not been given approved consent to use these people’s real names.  
To give an example, I was able to meet a potential business partner of Paka Adventures in 
Norway and managed to plan for an interview. The founders of this potential business partner 
cancelled the interview however, through later e-mail correspondence. They believed their 
situation had become too delicate, and therefore would not risk giving away any sensitive 
information. The ethically responsible thing to do was therefore to anonymize their business 
by giving them a pseudonym, as well as seclude information from the case study that could be 
of harm to this particular business. Referring to Longhurst (2010), the principle of 
confidentiality implies the responsibility of anonymizing informants when scientific research 
is to be presented. The participants have to be assured that any data will be treated in 
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confidentiality, and the researcher shall, in other words, show respect to the informants’ 
private life and situation, or as Hay (2010) states, it is important to protect and respect people 
and make sure the research are conducted fairly, without causing harm. 
Due to the delicate situation in which the potential business partner of Paka Adventures found 
themselves in, I have made sure to anonymize this business by giving them a pseudonym, as 
well as I have limited the empirical presentation in the case study chapter to only include 
information that will not be harmful to the business. I have furthermore chosen to anonymize 
actors and businesses involved in conflicting situations that will be presented in the case study 
narrative, as it is the ethically responsible thing to do. The process of anonymizing during my 
writing process has been challenging because, as also Yin (2014) states, it takes considerable 
effort to keep track of changes that has been done to components in the case study. In the next 
chapter I will present my case study, and I have marked the use of anonymity throughout the 
presentation of my empirical narrative by giving apostrophe when the pseudonym is first 
mentioned.  
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4. Case Study 
This chapter will introduce a narrative case study approach of my empirical evidence which 
will later be the main focus of my analysis chapter. As I have explained in the methodology 
chapter, chapter 3, I have done several in- depth interviews with a Norwegian entrepreneur 
couple and followed their main network of people, who has been of important influence in 
their business development from the very beginning. My main focus has been on the two 
Norwegians’ entrepreneurial history, in other words; how they have managed to come so far 
with their business, and on how networking has played its part in the different stages of their 
business development, from the moment the idea was planted until the official establishment 
and growth of their business. The narrative will be told from the Norwegian entrepreneurs’ 
point of view, in respect to the stories and experiences they have shared with me. The 
narrative will also be marked by the stories and experiences of key- members, which has been 
of importance to the two Norwegian entrepreneurs’ entrepreneurial process in various ways. 
Essentially, it is important to understand that, as Borch and Førde (2010) explain, that stories 
are never complete, as the stories can change in terms of who is telling the story and where it 
is told.  
By separating the case study narrative into three stages, the stories have become included in a 
linear course of events, which provides better structure and a better overview of the 
entrepreneurial process. In chapter 5 the different stages of the entrepreneurial process will be 
discussed through the theoretical framework of this thesis, as presented in chapter 2. As 
Thagaard (2009) states, it is important to have a proper holistic overview during the entire 
analytical process of the collected data material. Before I introduce the business which my 
case study research has been based on and further present my case study narrative, I will give 
practical data on the current situation, from the view of the adult population in Tanzania, 
regarding the matter of corruption. 
4.1 Case Study Introduction  
The recipe to become a successful business in Tanzania will, according to International 
Business Report (2014), include to 1) act fast, 2) avoid participation in corruption of any kind, 
3) understand the culture, and 4) be able to create long- term relations with the local 
environment.  
I will now present some of the results from a survey, performed in the time between April 
30th and May 6th in 2011, which presents the adult public perception of corruption in 
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Tanzania.  This survey was performed by Infinite Insight, and published by Transparency 
International in 2012.  
In the last three years, 64% of the survey participants answered that corruption had increased 
in the country. 49% admitted to have paid a bribe to at least one of nine service providers in 
Tanzania, where the police, judiciary and customs came out as the top three services 
connected to demanding or accepting bribes, as shown in the figure below: 
Figur 10: Tanzanian service providers and their level of accepting 
or demanding bribes 
 
Source: Transparency International (2012) 
Over 50% said the reason for their last bribe was to speed things up, over 20% said it was to 
avoid problems with authorities, and 30% said it was to receive a service they felt entitled to. 
The amount of the bribe that 45% of the participants had paid over the last 12 months, were 
between 30 and 99 US dollars, while 40% paid under 30US dollars and 14% paid between 
100 and 499 US dollars. 
Figure 11 presents the answers to which institutions the participants understood as the most 
trusted to fight corruption, where government leaders are on top. The business and private 
sector however, is low on the scale.  
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Figur 11: Most trusted institutions in Tanzania to fight against 
corruption 
 
Source: Transparency International (2012) 
In reference to the above mentioned results of the Transparency International Report (2014) it 
is apparent that residents in Tanzania experience corruption. Furthermore, the Tanzanian 
business environment, according to the World Bank (2013), is characterized by corruption, 
confusing labor laws and unnecessary administrative burdens, which all put a strain on the 
formalization of doing business in Tanzania. The business culture is absorbed with distrust 
due to continuously changes in policies, an unpredictable judicial system, and the excessive 
time spent on mitigation strategies instead of on more productive strategies for stimulating 
business activities. As can therefore be understood, Tanzania is not a country with tradition of 
supporting entrepreneurial activity. Nevertheless, due to the increasingly high interest from 
international investors, Tanzania has the potential of climbing the latter to more economic 
stability.  
From the website of Government Portal Content Committee (2013), Tanzania is portrayed as 
a country with many popular tourism attractions. National parks, such as Serengeti and 
Selous, historical sites, such as the Amboni caves and Stone Town in Zanzibar, the 
Ngorongoro crater and mount Kilimanjaro, is naming just a few of the popular attractions.  
The tourism sector is said to be one of the fastest growing sectors in the country. 
Paka Adventures Ltd (P.A) is a Tanzanian tourism business specializing in safari tours and 
customized experience- based round- trips. 49% of the business is owned by Norwegians, and 
51% is owned by Tanzanians. The business is founded and run by a married Norwegian 
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couple who live in Dar Es Salaam on a permanent basis. Paka means cat in Kiswahili, and is a 
reference to the lions that can be seen when being on a safari tour. 
The business is divided into two parts, where the first part consist of organizing Safari tours 
and customized trips through their main office in Dar Es Salaam near Mbezi Beach, and the 
second part being a beach resort located 40 km south of Kigamboni, approximately two hours 
from Dar Es Salaam, called The Lighthouse Beach Resort.  Paka Adventures consist of 
approximately 30 employees, where half of the employees work at the beach resort.  
As presented in chapter 2.1, it is known in business literature that a business goes through an 
idea stage, an establishment stage and a growth stage, which makes out the entrepreneurial 
process of a business. In the process of producing a narrative of the entrepreneurial process of 
my case study, I chose to use the same structure of three stages of business, which will 
generate a good overview. Each of the stages will focus on the two main informants’ 
experiences with networking and the influence networking has had for them in the Tanzanian 
business culture, as this will be focus for later analysis in chapter 7. Below I give a short 
description of the stages and what each of the stages will contain. 
The idea- generation stage 
During the idea generation stage the aim is to present the process of how the idea of the 
business came to life. The focus in this stage will be to explain why the entrepreneurs decided 
to move to Tanzania and how they came up with the idea of establishing their own business.  
The establishment stage 
During the establishment stage the aim is to present the process of how the entrepreneurs 
managed to establish their business, and what experiences they would find challenging.  
The growth and development stage 
During the growth and development stage the aim is to present the ongoing processes which 
the entrepreneurs believe will help their business grow, and understanding why and how they 
have reached success in obtaining growth.  
By presenting my case study as a narrative story based on my empirical data, I will provide a 
contextual and informative presentation of the entrepreneurial story behind Paka Adventures. 
The entrepreneurial story is told from the entrepreneurs’ point of view and experiences. I 
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have, however, integrated the experiences of other informants where I felt it deemed 
necessary and natural for the context of the story. The narrative has been produced by my 
subjective understanding of the qualitative empirical evidence collected from the combined 
experiences of the Norwegian entrepreneurs, important key persons involved in the business 
as well as other staff and my own observations.  
I will further present the entrepreneurial history of how Eivind Tungland and Helene 
Tungland came to start Paka Adventures, and I will refer to the informants by first name, to 
create a personal connection to the entrepreneurs. Informants that are necessary to anonymize 
have been given pseudonyms, as explained in chapter 3.3. 
4.2 Stage 1: Idea generation 
In the 1990’s Eivind worked as a specialized engineer in the North Sea for a Norwegian 
company. As this was very physical work, Eivind had to find a different type of work as he 
started struggling after a back injury. Eivind found employment with Norwegian People Aid 
(NPA), and started working in their rescue service as an international consultant. Through this 
employment with the NPA, he spent a short time in Africa and the mid- east to attend 
different presentations where he learned how people lived and worked. In the year 2000, 
Eivind visited Tanzania for the first time after being invited by his colleague in the NPA. This 
colleague had bought land and built himself a holiday home in Kigamboni, where Eivind 
stayed during his visit. The house was located a good two hour drive from Dar Es Salaam city 
centre. The NPA colleague introduced Eivind to another Norwegian, who also owned land 
close to the beach in Kigamboni where he had built a few tents at the beach. A couple of years 
later, these tents got replaced with bungalows, and the “Kasa Beach Resort” was established. 
Through his relation with the Norwegian friend of his colleague, Eivind met Frank, a native of 
the Tanzanian region, whom he became good friends with. 
Eivind became intrigued by the life in Tanzania, and 6 months after his return to Norway he 
was on his way back. This time he brought a four week travel plan, so that he would be able 
to experience as much adventure as Tanzania could possibly offer. During these weeks he 
created many more relations, and the most significant relationship he created, was with the 
leader of the Kidagaa village in Kigamboni. 
The very night before Eivind was due to travel back to Norway, the leader of the village in 
Kidagaa came to him and said: “Eivind, you should have some land as well, shouldn’t you?”. 
Eivind responded: “Why not, but I am leaving tomorrow”. The next morning the village 
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leader came to Eivind with some papers in his hand and said: “Here, you can buy this land”. 
Eivind responded: “Well, ok then”. The land was located close to the beach, and not far from 
the up and coming Kasa Beach Resort. At the time Eivind could only afford to pay the village 
leader 10 % of the given land price of 900 000 Tanzanian shilling, which is approximately 
567 American dollars today. They therefore made a plan for Eivind to pay the rest upon his 
return to Tanzania ten months later, which he did.  
During his longer and longer visits back and forth to Tanzania, Eivind became engaged to a 
woman from Dar es Salaam. Eivind’s fiancé had a daughter named Nazra from a previous 
relationship, and Eivind grew a strong connection to Nazra. The relationship between Nazra’s 
mother and Eivind however, came to an end. Even though he did not know it at the time, the 
relationship he shared with Nazra and her mother, would become one of his most important 
factors for his sense of belonging in Tanzania at a later stage. Eivind became well acquainted 
with another Tanzanian native, who will henceforth go under the pseudonym of “Robert”. 
Robert owned his own safari business as well as a small beach resort. Eivind and Robert aided 
Frank in gaining employment with a Norwegian immigrant, where Frank would be helping 
with the process of establishing a business. Frank, Robert and Eivind would joke about the 
day Eivind would move to Tanzania, because Frank would then start working with Eivind and 
Robert instead. This came very close to what actually happened.   
As time went by, Eivind travelled back and forth to Tanzania, and he could not stop 
contemplating about what he should do with his land in Kigamboni. In 2004, he met Helene 
when he was home in Norway. Eivind and Helene entered into a relationship, and Eivind 
started telling her about life in Tanzania. They started spending their holidays in Tanzania 
together. Helene was struggling with an illness that made her unable to work in Norway, and 
the climate in Tanzania would prove to be the remedy. Because of the increased visits to 
Tanzania, and the benefits of the Tanzanian climate which improved Helene’s health, Eivind 
and Helene decided to build a holiday home on the land Eivind owned in Kigamboni. In 2006 
Eivind learned that the mother of Nazra had died. Helene and Eivind were asked to take care 
of Nazra by the family. The family had hopes that Eivind and Helene might take Nazra with 
them to Norway, but it would not be that easy. Eivind and Helene made sure Nazra would be 
able to go to a good school, and they both understood that the process of having her move to 
Norway, would be too long and too difficult. 
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Even before they received the responsibility of Nazra, Eivind and Helene had already talked 
about travelling and working internationally. The fact that Helene was unable to work in 
Norway because of her illness, made them consider the possibility of them moving to 
Tanzania on a more permanent basis, instead of moving Nazra to Norway. Both Eivind and 
Helene had gained a strong sense of belonging to Tanzania and the community around them; 
they had good friends, a foster daughter and a holiday home. The final decisive factor 
regarding staying in Tanzania, came when Helene’s doctor recommended her to have 100% 
work status for two years with NPA in Tanzania through The Norwegian Labour and Welfare 
Service (NAV). This recommendation was made on the basis of how the climate made her 
healthy. Therefore, in December 2007 Eivind and Helene had packed over 120 kg of luggage 
and were ready to start their lives in Tanzania. Eivind had taken leave from work and “tagged 
along”, thinking he would have time to learn how to play the guitar.  
4.2.1 The idea of the Safari business 
 
Figur 12: Two of Paka Adventures’ Safari Cars 
Source: Private photo 
Eivind quickly became restless and felt the need to do something, anything. He was therefore 
taught how to do safari game drives, through his Tanzanian friend, Robert, whom he met in 
2000. Robert was a safari guide by trade and whenever Eivind and Helene had visitors from 
Norway, which were quite often, Robert and Eivind arranged safari tours for them. Robert, 
50 
 
Eivind and Helene could see the potential in the market and started discussing the idea of 
creating a safari company together. Robert would have most of the knowledge and expertise, 
and Eivind and Helene would supply the starting capital. Eivind and Helene became anxious 
to start their new venture. Robert, however, told them he would not join their business at that 
time, though urged them to start by themselves. When Robert would become more “able” to 
take part in the business he would join them. Eivind and Helene were excited and ready, and 
therefore it did not take long until they used their own savings to buy a safari car. Not long 
after, a loan of approximately 30 000 American dollars was decided to be used as start capital, 
and another safari car was bought. The two cars were all Eivind and Helene had for a long 
time while building up their lives in Tanzania. It was a good opportunity to find out if this was 
something they actually would manage to do on their own, as Robert had become silent and 
unreachable.  
In 2008 Eivind and Helen decided to get married and arranged for a wedding party in Dar es 
Salaam. When they sent out invitations, and they believed that maybe 15 people would be 
able to attend, because of the long travel. Surprisingly, 32 people booked tickets. This would 
be the final test of their safari business, as all of their guests wanted to experience the 
adventure of a safari. After working persistently for six weeks, from the first guest arrived, 
until the last guest had left, Eivind and Helene realized that they had found their calling. Both 
were driven and motivated by the thought of what they could manage to do. The sky would be 
their limit. After the wedding party Eivind and Helene made professional websites and started 
marketing their idea of custom-made trips for Norwegians in Tanzania, which included their 
very own safari tours. Helene ended her work with NPA and all of her focus was now on 
making a living for them. The “word of mouth” from friends and family spread fast and the 
two Norwegian entrepreneurs had soon many customers heading their way. 
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4.2.2 The Idea of The Lighthouse Beach Resort  
 
Figur 13: The entrepreneurs’ holiday home, and the first building of 
the Lighthouse Beach Resort 
Source: Private photo 
Robert and his experience of doing business in the tourism industry, was an important 
resource for Eivind and Helene. First of all, Robert had contacts in the safari business that he 
would introduce Eivind and Helene to, and second, Robert had valuable knowledge about the 
safari business, which included planning game drives, repairs of safari cars, and how to be a 
good safari guide. Moreover, Robert owned a small beach resort in which friends and family 
of Eivind and Helene had stayed at during their visits to Tanzania. As the business plan of 
Paka Adventures was starting to form, Eivind and Helene decided to use Robert’s beach resort 
for accommodation for their customers as well. One day, however, Eivind and Helene 
received a message stating that Robert had sold his resort. They therefore had no 
accommodation for their already booked customers whom were due to arrive in only a few 
months. Robert had for reasons, Eivind and Helene to this day does not really understand, 
turned on their friendship. Helene believes it may have been jealousy behind the conflict that 
emerged, that Robert never expected them to actually go through with their business idea and 
he likely never expected them to do well. Suddenly, officers from The Department of 
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Immigration were on their doorstep, asking for specific papers, which at that particular time 
were handed in to the immigration office. This knowledge were known only to a select few of 
the closest people in Eivind and Helene’s life, including Robert. The struggles following this 
conflict, made Eivind and Helene realize that the public institutions in Tanzania could harass 
them for money due to hear say. Eivind and Helene refused to engage in corruption, as they 
had all permits at the immigration office and were only waiting for approval. Because of this, 
Eivind was arrested and jailed on more than one occasion, due to the resistance of paying the 
immigration officers off. By contacting Frank, the situation came somewhat under control. 
Frank used his network, his so called “smallchaps”, which is people on grass-root level in 
many different government institutions, to solve the situation. The situation ended with an 
immigration employee losing her job because she was found guilty of taking bribes from an 
unknown third party. 
Eivind and Helene were now in a bit of a complicated situation, as they had no place to 
accommodate their customers who would be arriving soon. They had often let out their 
holiday home to their family and friends, although their holiday home on the beach in 
Kigamboni would not be of adequate size for all their customers. They had the choice of 
booking their guests into another beach resort, but became intrigued by the idea of owning 
their own beach resort. It did not take long until Eivind and Helene decided to accommodate 
the arriving guests by themselves, and they started the process of building another house next 
to their holiday home in Kigamboni. This was the start of reaching their ambition of owning 
their very own beach resort. They managed to finish the house only hours before the 
customers arrived, and the result was satisfied customers fuelling the ambition of the two 
Norwegian entrepreneurs. Owning a beach resort, meant that Eivind and Helene would be in 
control of accommodating their guests themselves and they would not have to rely on others 
to provide good accommodation for their customers. Their business model started to expand. 
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4.3 Stage 2: The Establishment  
 
Figur 14: The entrance to Paka Adventures’ office 
Source: Private photo 
Eivind and Helene did not have sufficient knowledge on how to proceed with developing their 
business, in the sense that it would become sustainable. They did thankfully have Frank who 
would become invaluable during this stage. When Eivind and Helene decided to officially 
start up the business, Frank even became their business partner. During Frank’s work for the 
other Norwegian, whom Eivind introduced Frank to, he had gained experience of the process 
on starting a business in Tanzania. His knowledge became to be invaluable to the planning 
and development of  Paka Adventures Ltd. Frank had an “aunt” everywhere, who introduced 
him to his so called “smallchaps”.  Frank’s “smallchaps” was the people that worked far down 
in the governmental hierarchy and in public institutions (for example in The Department of 
Immigration). The smallachaps had very small fees and rarely accepted bribes. In contrast 
Eivind and Helene could have paid large fees to the “smallchap’s” superiors, the people high 
up in the social and working ladder. The two Norwegian entrepreneurs would most likely 
have had to pay a lot of money going into deep pockets. Being ok with paying extra to make 
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the process go faster was not an option, and Frank started using his network of “smallchaps” 
from the very beginning of the establishment stage. Frank was immensely valuable in pushing 
the building process of the beach resort forward, which Eivind and Helene named “The 
Lighthouse Beach Resort”. Also, Frank was highly important for the safari business as well as 
his ability to push papers through government institutions and achieve the permits needed to 
establish their business, where abilities which Eivind and Helene did not have at that time. 
Today, Frank is not only a shareholder in the company, he is also the hotel manager at The 
Lighthouse Beach Resort and head chef at the resort’s restaurant. Frank has also been 
responsible for employing a lot of the local staff, both at Lighthouse and at the Paka 
Adventure office in Dar Es Salaam. 
Mpenda, was introduced to Eivind by his NPA collegue in 2003 when Eivind first visited the 
resort Kasa Beach in Kigamboni. When Eivind and Helene started building their holiday 
home, they all became very good friends and Mpenda refers to Eivind and Helene as his 
family. Mpenda used to work as the two Norwegian entrepreneur’s “askari” when they built 
The Lighthouse Beach Resort. “Askari” is a person who supervises and solves problems. 
Mpenda was a big part of managing the building project as he lived in the Kidagaa village, 
and he had close relations towards the villagers who became employed at the resort. Helene 
and Eivind recognize him as a key person in the establishment of The Lighthouse Beach 
Resort. Eivind was the best man in Mpenda’s wedding as well. Today Mpenda works part 
time as an askari, as he also runs a small neighboring guesthouse next to The Lighthouse 
Beach Resort. 
As The Lighthouse Beach Resort and the safari business developed Eivind and Helene needed 
to employ more and more staff.  Even before starting the building process Eivind and Helene 
had become very attached to the Kidagaa village situated close by the resort, and they wanted 
to give something back to their community. They wanted the village to take part in The 
Lighthouse Beach Resort, and saw the opportunity to make the resort to a place of 
employment for the local villagers. Most of the villagers had no education, and the process of 
providing basic work training for them began. The local villagers who were offered work had 
to comprehend different work positions at the beach resort, and continuous work training 
became an investment for Paka Adventures. The result would turn out to be unique and not 
what one would expect when visiting a beach resort, as Frank expressed; “Our people smile 
and are happy and helping, it comes from their heart. “If I give you crisps I think you will be 
happy”- that is how the staff cares for the customers”.  
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The staff single handedly created an atmosphere at the resort which later became the 
trademark for the resort, and which I experienced during my stay at the resort and have 
understood to be close to impossible for others to copy. Throughout my stay at the resort I got 
the sense of belonging, like the resort was my home. There were no one telling me at what 
time breakfast, lunch or dinner would be, instead I was asked when I wanted it. It was, in a 
way, obvious that the training of the staff at the Lighthouse Resort had not only been 
emphasizing the typical customer service one usually would experience at luxury resorts. 
Instead it seemed the staff had also been given the opportunity to integrate their own way of 
making their guests feel at home. It was the natural familiar way in which the staff conducted 
themselves among themselves and in front of me that I, in retrospect, would find as key to the 
sense of feeling at home. Eivind and Helene have marketed The Lighthouse Beach Resort as 
“your home away from home”, and the reason behind this will be clear to those who 
experience the staff and their inimitable approach to ensure your comfort. 
Besides creating employment opportunities, Eivind and Helene purchased as much as possible 
of the material needed to build their resort from local manufacturers. By purchasing local 
products during the build as well as continuing to purchase what was needed to run their 
resort, Eivind and Helene have been able to see the effect it has had on the community over 
time. Shops have been updated to include refrigerators and freezers, enabling them to buy 
cold drinks instead of warm. Furthermore, the roads have improved, the houses in the village 
have become of better quality and due to their sponsoring project of the local children school, 
the level of education are rising.  
In an expanding business, Eivind and Helene understood that they would be in need of 
educated staff, as they would not be able to keep up with the extensive work by themselves. 
The business needed talented mechanics to work in their garage, or “an everything man”, 
which is called a “fundi” in Kiswahili, as well as educated staff for their office. Frank 
especially was of great importance in this matter. He took it upon himself to find educated, 
talented or experienced local staff in which he trusted 100%. If someone were to become a 
part of the business they had to become a part of the “Paka family”, and if they damaged the 
business they would damage the family. From the beginning, Eivind, Helene and Frank 
wanted a staff that would respect and trust each other and also a staff that would understand 
the meaning of their collective vision to grow a business together as a family. The staff would 
often bring forward applications on behalf of friends or family members, and in this way, the 
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staff member introducing and vouching for the new member of staff would have a natural 
responsibility of the new member of staff. 
Eivind and Helene also experienced to receive applications from people who had seen their 
safari cars in the streets, or somehow heard about them from others. The business had a 
demand for educated people working in important positions in the business, such as safari 
guides, hotel managers, mechanics or being part of the office administration. The employment 
of “outsiders” not known to the Paka Adventures family was a risk they had to take to be able 
to keep up with their expanding development. Most applicants would be qualified and do a 
good job. An example of this is their office co-manager Dzene, who today works closely 
together with Helene. Dzene had heard about their business through some tourists who had 
been customers of Paka Adventures during his business study in Austria. He therefore 
contacted Eivind when he came back to Tanzania. Dzene became an employee and started 
with simple administration chores at the office, and in just a few months he got promoted to 
be office manager. Dzene’s involvement in the office became appreciated by Eivind and 
Helene, and they saw his potential to take part in their future development. Dzene was eager 
to put up suggestions for increased profit, and would share his knowledge and experience 
from working with a tour operator in Zanzibar, an island just outside Tanzania.  
By connecting Norwegian students to do practical hotel work to gain mandatory experience, 
in trade for accommodation and a small salary, the entrepreneurs expanded their sorely 
needed educated workforce. Incidentally, one of their students had a father working in a 
tourism agency in Norway, and through this contact the entrepreneurs were introduced to a 
collaboration which gave them more marketing advantage. 
Eivind and Helene would on a couple of occasions experience employees they were forced to 
fire as a result of stealing. Such incidents became the reason why Eivind started finishing 
every interview session he had with potential employees by stating: “if you think of stealing 
from this business it is better to not take the job. Because, no matter how you do it I will 
always find out”.  
One episode would especially become imprinted in their memory. One employee, who had 
put together a great safari routine for Paka Adventures and participated in many levels of the 
business, was taking advantage of Einvind and Helene’s trust. The employee executed a so 
called “Nigerian scam”, sending out a joint e-mail to all Paka Adventures’ customers, asking 
for money for his/hers sick daughter. Many of the recipients of the e-mail were previous 
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customers who had met, gotten to know and cared for this employee. Luckily, Helene was 
notified not long after, by a customer asking whether or not it was a very serious condition the 
daughter of the employee was in, and if they could contribute more to her recovery. Quick on 
her feet, Helene warned all their customers of their employee’s scam, and managed to do 
damage control to the best of her ability. She tried to reassure all of the customers that the 
daughter was strong and healthy, and sadly it was all a lie. Some customers might have sent 
some money, though Eivind and Helene never heard anything about it. Many of Paka 
Adventures’ previous customers, as well as Eivind and Helene themselves, thought very 
highly of this staff member, which made it all that harder when they had to fire this person. 
As such incidents are very damaging for the tourism industry in Tanzania; the person 
responsible for the scam experienced an enormous pressure from the entire tourism industry 
in Dar Es Salaam, since everyone knows everyone in the tourism industry. The person was 
asked to sign a contract where it was stated that he/she would never work in tourism again.  
4.3.1 Investment 
After more than a year of working full time on establishing their business in Tanzania, Eivind 
and Helene finally went home to Norway on holiday to visit family and friends in 2009.   
During the stay in Norway Eivind and Helene were able to update their family in great detail 
about how far they had come with their business, and what their goals were. Helene’s father, a 
business man, wanted to help out. At the time her father was in position of releasing himself 
of some capital, and with a deficit he therefore sold a cabin to help Helene and Eivind with 
their finances. Helene and Eivind borrowed money from the bank to pay for the cabin, with 
Eivind’s dad being a guarantor for the loan. Since Helene’s father sold the cabin with a 
deficit, they could use the money saved to build up their business. This included their 
Lighthouse Beach Resort and their safari business. Since Eivind and Helene bought the cabin, 
it has been let out to a private Norwegian business which pays the interest on their loan. 
Therefore they do not have to pay for the upkeep. 
Helene’s father also helped them by co- signing another bank loan, and when they bought 
another safari car Eivind’s father helped them with some money as well. Eivind and Helene 
remember how they had struggled, trying to find the capital for their employees’ salaries. The 
employees had had trust in them, accepting that their payments would come, although a bit 
late. Without the support of Eivind and Helene’s families the economic challenges in the first 
years would have been even more difficult, if not impossible.  
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The biggest surprise for Helene and Eivind would come when The Lighthouse Beach Resort 
had been finished. The rooms were ready and staff eager to start working. After investing a lot 
of money into building up the business before generating any profit, there were unfortunately 
no customers. It was an eye opener when they faced this side of running a business, as Helene 
said: “We came down here and started building with our hearts, not our brains”. To get paying 
customers, they needed a marketing strategy. They started the process of marketing 
themselves, but in retrospect they regret their lack of business experience which cost them a 
lot of potential profit in a very sensitive stage of their business. 
Among other marketing strategies, Eivind and Helene chose to paint their safari cars orange, 
which would give them some local marketing, as well as it would be an eye catcher for 
potential customers looking at safari pictures on their websites. The safari cars stood out from 
the other safari companies’ cars and Paka Adventures gained a lot of attention this way. They 
attracted customers, potential employees and an illusion in the community that they were 
bigger than they were as a business. However, it came with a cost. During conflicts, especially 
with the “Bambu Hotel” which will be explained later, they were more exposed in the orange 
car than what they would have been in a green or a beige colored safari car, which the 
majority of the safari companies use. Being different made them easily recognized, and while 
doing errands, like going to the bank or collecting money to pay for group safaris, they 
sometimes felt more exposed. This was a risk, as the sum of money could be up to 20 000 
USD. 
Not all of their staff agreed on the color in the start. They had an incident with the park owner 
of a game reserve outside Dar es Salaam, who accused Paka Adventures of being ignorant of 
the animals. It was their opinion where that most animals would be frightened by the orange 
color. One of the safari guides employed at Paka Adventures mentioned this incident to one of 
their safari customers, and Helene received a complaint from this customer after the trip. The 
customer was under the impression that he could have seen more animals if it had not been for 
the color that allegedly scared animals. As soon as Helene and Eivind became aware of this 
they did a lot of research to be able to provide documented facts that the color had no impact 
on the animals. If it was brought up again they would be able to provide these documents as a 
reassurance. The color had no effect on the animals, and could be continued to be used as a 
marketing strategy. 
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4.3.2 Expansion 
Paka Adventures started their business with help from friends and family, but now they found 
themselves in a stage where they were in need of seeking more knowledge to develop their 
business further. Eivind and Helene gained many benefits from being connected to the 
Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania, and through being a part of the Embassy’s network and 
assistance, they were able to find sub- suppliers and expand their business. The Norwegian 
Embassy would provide them with advice about the business climate in Tanzania, but also 
connected them to potential contacts of interest.   
Especially, one yearly event became important to Eivind and Helene. Every 17th of May 
(Norwegian constitution day) the Ambassador herself would invite 15 to 20 Norwegian 
business owners to come to dinner in her private home. This created an arena of networking 
opportunities between Norwegian businesses. Eivind and Helene came to meet other tourism 
businesses owned or run by Norwegians, and through these connections they could exchange 
experiences and knowledge about doing business in Tanzania. Some of the tourism 
businesses, Eivind and Helene also started to collaborate with. 
It was, for example, through The Norwegian Embassy that Helene became aware of another 
Norwegian woman running a safari company called Wild Tracks in Arusha together with her 
Tanzanian husband. Wild Tracks and Paka Adventures are today collaborating together by 
outsourcing customers to each other. For example, if Wild Tracks have customers that wish to 
do game drives in Selous game preserve they will recommend Paka Adventures as they 
operate most of their safaris there. If Paka Adventures have customers that wish to do a game 
drive in Serengeti they will recommend Wild Tracks, who run their safaris there. This sort of 
collaboration became very important to Paka Adventures, as it generated more profit. 
The advantage of Wild Tracks was how the co-founder, and husband of Beate, was a native 
Tanzanian with an established network from the very start of their business establishment. 
Even though the process of starting their business took long, Beate explained how she was 
sure it would have been a much longer process without the influence of her husband, and his 
connections. Beate expressed her gratitude towards the Norwegian Embassy in Dar Es 
Salaam, especially because of the connections the embassy are able to provide for them. 
Through creating relations with other Norwegians, knowledge and experiences would be 
shared, especially in regards to marketing their coffee brand in Dar Es Salaam. Beate could 
also tell stories about corrupt immigration officers, and how they struggled to avoid taking 
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part in corruption. As a result of a conflict with another actor in the community, immigration 
officers would turn up when Wild Tracks’ customers visited the orphanage to donate charity, 
accusing the customers for not being tourists based on third party information. When the 
immigration officers constantly would show up, demanding volunteer visa from the 
customers, Wild Tracks had to end the collaboration with the orphanage.  
In 2013 Eivind were called in to a meeting at the embassy to meet with Innovation Norway. 
At the time Innovation Norway collaborated with The Norwegian Embassy to be able to 
gather most of the Norwegian business owners in Tanzania. This was to establish whether or 
not they should develop a new branch office in Tanzania or Kenya. Eivind attended this 
meeting, although he did not and still does not recognize Innovation Norway to be a 
beneficial factor for their business in particular. By experience Innovation Norway had 
become more or less a non- existent to Eivind and Helene, and they came to the conclusion 
that they would benefit more from support from local and foreign people stationed in 
Tanzania on how to run and develop their business further. 
The local businesses would often prove to lack knowledge and a less than serious sense of 
doing business. In this respect, Helene and Eivind further learned the benefit of collaborating 
with businesses run by foreigners instead of local businesses in the tourism industry. The 
quality and security around their customers became the most important factor to them to 
control. 
Eivind and Helene wanted to offer their customers more in regards to experiences which the 
tourism industry in Tanzania could offer. Through networking Eivind and Helene made 
collaborations with hotels and lodges in both Tanzania and in Zanzibar. They created 
mutually beneficial partnerships with other safari companies that covered different game 
reserves in other parts of the country, as well as companies doing Kilimanjaro trekking. 
Eivind and Helene’s strategy of expanding their network of sub- suppliers made them capable 
to provide their customers with more opportunities to experience different adventures in 
Tanzania.  The focus was to work hard to maintain and nurture the business network, and it 
paid off.  The collaboration with the owners of a lodge in Selous game reserve grew to the 
extent that Eivind and Helene felt as if it had become their own. 
However, as the two Norwegian entrepreneurs would experience in the worst way imaginable, 
some partnerships are not meant to be. The rapid growth of the business made Eivind and 
Helene understand the need to find a proper office for their many business endeavors. The 
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back garden of their private home in Dar es Salaam had been used to build safari cars and do 
repairs on them, and the Paka Adventures’ office had been put up just meters away. Having a 
home office, they learned, was not very effective as something always distracted them from 
doing the needed office work. The entrepreneurs started looking for a more proper place to set 
up their office, and they contacted one of their hotel sub-suppliers in Dar es Salaam. The hotel 
will be referred to by the fictive name Bambu Hotel. By accommodating many of their 
customers here Paka Adventures generated approximately 50 000 dollars in income every 
year for the hotel in question. The owners of the hotel were therefore more than happy to offer 
Paka Adventures some office space at their hotel.  
All parts were satisfied with the agreement, but after some time the owners of the Bambu 
Hotel approached Eivind and Helene with a business proposal. The owners wanted to expand 
their business and had decided to build a lodge in Selou. Due to Eivind and Helene’s 
experience in building The Lighthouse Beach Resort, they wanted Eivind and Helene to be in 
charge of the building process. Eivind and Helene agreed to the proposal and signed a 
contract which said they would build the lodge on behalf of the hotel. Eivind and Helene 
received a first amount of 10 000 dollars to start the building process.  
In good time before all the money had been spent, Eivind and Helene sought after the next 
payment from the hotel owners. The contract stated that they would receive the money by that 
time. The money never came, and before Eivind and Helene understood the situation they 
were in, they used some of their own money to make sure the building process would not 
come to a halt, and challenge their time schedule. Nevertheless, the point of realization 
dawned on them, and Eivind and Helene decided to break the contract because of the lack of 
funding and the great lack of professionalism.  
The response from the hotel owners were to shut down the office of Paka Adventures, steal all 
of the office supplies, as well as demanding to be refunded the 10 000 dollars that had already 
been used on their own lodge project. When Eivind and Helene broke the contract it was in an 
early stage, and 10 000 dollars were in hindsight not great amount, as the total of the contract 
was close to one million dollars. However, both Eivind and Helene felt they owed the hotel 
nothing as they even had paid some of the materials required for the construction from their 
own pockets, and asked for a clean break from the collaboration. The owners of Bambu Hotel 
however, were not satisfied and started a very difficult and damaging conflict for Paka 
Adventures. Helene explains the situation as follows: 
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It was a very scary and uncomfortable time for us. I remember when my, then one year 
old, child and I were on our way to the airport to fly home to Norway on holiday and 
we suddenly met the owners of the hotel who started threatening us by saying things 
like “I don’t want to hurt you but I will take your kid if you don’t give us the money”. 
That was terrifying, but it gave us two choices; go to war or let it die out by its own. 
Eivind and Helene came to the realization that keeping a low profile was the appropriate 
course of action, hoping that the conflict would fade out. The challenges were nevertheless a 
huge struggle. Eivind was often picked up by the police who jailed him for the night. There 
was never an official reason for jailing Eivind, although the police had been “tipped” off by 
some anonymous third party. Different government institutions were constantly being 
contacted by a third party as well. Some of the claims were that Paka Adventures were an 
illegal company with no business license, and that Eivind and Helene had no legal resident 
permit and visa, so they shouldn’t be allowed to stay in the country. Frank stated the 
following about the situation: 
I met with the people who had been given the negative reports and showed them all 
documents they thought we didn’t have, showed them the taxes which were paid, I 
showed receipts, yes everything they could need and they realized it was all lies. I still 
don’t know if this conflict is over, because you never know what people are planning. 
Personally it is scary, for the business it is no problem. We manage.  
Frank worked hard trying to keep the government institutions from believing the lies that the 
owners of the Bambu Hotel reported about them. By giving false information and paying off 
government officials, the hotel owners attempted to destroy Paka Adventures. They would not 
succeed however. Frank met with all of the people which had been involved from the 
government, and showed them all the necessary documents, receipts and everything they 
thought Paka Adventures did not possess. By doing this the government side of the conflict 
realized that the accusations against Paka Adventures had been based on lies and dismissed 
the case. It became clear to Eivind and Helene that they needed to grow a stronger local 
network to be able to handle similar situations coming their way, in terms of immigration, 
police or other institutional struggles in the future. Eivind reflected over the conflict with the 
following words: 
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We actually truly believe we gained more than we lost during this conflict as it made 
us realize and understand the importance of doing networking, finding people who 
would have our back and who could be taking care of us and vice versa.  
Beside the loss of income and the time they could have spent on nurturing their own business, 
the two Norwegian entrepreneurs felt in retrospect that the conflict was a positive experience 
for them as business owners in Tanzania. Eivind and Helene learned not to be naïve, knowing 
that they had been a bit ignorant trying to succeed in Tanzania and expecting no trouble at all. 
In the wake of the conflict in 2011, Eivind and Helene decided to change their business to 
become a 100% Tanzanian business. This was one of the main consequences from 
experiencing the threats and unpleasant situations that followed the conflict with the Bambu 
Hotel. Eivind and Helene wanted to secure and build up the safety around their business, and 
together with Frank they sought out and established a board of trustees. Among these trustees 
was a lawyer, a businessman from the Chaga Tribe in Moshi and a Russian with three PhD’s 
who is currently a professor at the university of Dar Es Salaam. The board of trustees would 
not be a very formal or active part of the business. The board would nevertheless provide 
safety as Eivind and Helene would be able to bring them in whenever it would be necessary. 
Bringing out “the big cannons”, as Eivind would call it, would be done by contacting the 
chairman of the board. The chairman is the son of a Swedish diplomat who currently resides 
in Sweden, and who today works part time promoting tours for Paka Adventures.  
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4.4 Stage 3: Growth and Development 
 
Figur 15: Paka Adventures’s stand on the annual travel fare in Oslo 
Source: Private photo 
Eivind and Helene experienced very few other businesses in the tourism industry in Tanzania 
that would have the same area of focus as their Paka Adventures business. Most would sell 
safari tours, and help customers plan their trip to Zanzibar or other places. It was very few that 
would provide customized trips, ensuring that the customer’s stay in Tanzania would be 
optimized. Through great customer contact through e-mail correspondence Eivind and Helene 
have a focus on getting to know all customers fairly well before they even meet them in 
Tanzania. The idea behind this is to be able to provide a sense of safety to the customers, but 
also to ensure that Paka Adventures could give them a great impression and experience of 
Tanzania. In the same way as Eivind and Helene had, when they first visited the country.  
If Eivind and Helene were able to possess a greater part of the «chain of value», they would 
see a great increase in profit. Being able to make sure their customers are satisfied of all 
aspects of their trip to Tanzania, was and is something the two entrepreneurs believe to be 
very different from how their competitors operate. Even though it is much more time 
consuming; they have found it to be worth it. As Helene put it:  
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We don’t believe we are best in the world, but we are trying to be as best as we 
possibly can be. We tell all our customers that we are not the cheapest and not the 
most expensive; we take what we need to be able to continue building our business. 
4.4.1 Goals and vision 
Many large safari companies with more than 300 safari cars can sell safaris for much less 
compared to Paka Adventures, and still make a good profit, as they carry out hundreds of 
safari trips at the same time. Many of these big businesses are located in the North of 
Tanzania, close to the Serengeti game reserve, and the Ngorongoro crater which are very 
popular places for travelers to choose to do their safaris. By doing game drives in the Selous 
game reserve, east in Tanzania and closer to Dar Es Salaam, Eivind and Helene could offer a 
more private Safari experience, where customer would more seldom meet other safari cars. 
The experience would therefore be more unique. Furthermore, Eivind and Helene believes the 
focus on the Selous game reserve will give them a vast advantage in the future, as they 
strongly believe that the Selous park will become more and more popular.  
Their vision of making Paka Adventures together with the community has generated a lot of 
good will within that community. The focus on having community development as a part of 
their business strategy separates Paka Adventures from being a pure profit seeking business, 
as many other businesses in the tourism industry in Tanzania are. To be working with the 
community to make a change has been important to the entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures, as 
Eivind also states by saying the following:  
Once we counted that there were 92 children that were guaranteed education because 
of our employment of their parents. This I personally believe is much more interesting 
to put up as an achievement, rather than telling people how many cars we have etc. 
Cars are just an instrument. The ripple effects of our business being a part of the 
community are very important to us. 
Today Eivind and Helene have a goal of starting up a “village academy”, which will be a 
learning center providing a basic level of education. This village academy will have a vision 
to provide local Tanzanians the opportunity for an education and an internship, which will 
teach them a trade and further the possibility of them gaining employment. Eivind and 
Helene’s vision is to offer the students attending the village academy internships at The 
Lighthouse Beach Resort. At the completion of the internship, the interns will be given a 
certificate validating their education and practical training, for example as a waiter, chef or a 
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cleaning lady. The Lighthouse Beach resort will give the students practical experience, and 
the goal will be to enhance the locals’ possibility of employment. Eivind and Helene also see 
themselves building more Lighthouse Beach resorts in Tanzania, making it into a chain of 
resorts, which would also mean being able to offer more people employment.  
Hotel manager Bridgette experienced how the choice made by Eivind and Helene, in regards 
to the development of The Lighthouse Beach Resort, to be the best of both worlds. She felt 
that Eivind and Helene focused on professionalism to be able to run a profitable business, as 
well as they included the community to take part in the development of the business. The 
effect of this Bridgette explained as follows: 
The people in our community here all know who Paka Adventures are, and the 
influence Eivind and Helene have had has created a foundation of deep respect. For 
the community they are doing things the Tanzanian way, the right way. And then there 
is the Norwegian way which they need to have in order to run their business, bringing 
customers. 
The growth of Paka Adventures has been noticed by the Tanzanian tourism community, and 
most other companies know who they are. On several occasions, Eivind and Helene have 
been approached by local safari companies who seek their advice. In a way, Eivind and 
Helene feel they are seen as some sort of a “Big Brother” by other safari companies, even 
companies that are bigger and have more cars than them.  
In regards to the future, Dzene, the office manager, believes in the further success of Paka 
Adventures but he wants their international network to expand more, by saying: “The 
international network of Paka Adventure is good, but our main target is Norway. I have 
advised Eivind and Helene to not only focus on Norway, but also different areas”.  
4.4.2 Potential partnerships and mergers 
In the beginning of October 2013 Eivind said the following about their future growth of 
network: “We are currently working towards building alliances, where all can win in the sense 
that “together we are stronger”. It is an exciting process that is still unclear in regards to what 
way it will go”.  
With many sub-suppliers in their network, including the lodges, hotels, Kilimanjaro tour 
operators, safari companies and so on, Helene and Eivind were now capable to meet a big 
variety of the criteria the different customers travelling through them had. In mid-October 
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2013, Eivind and Helene agreed to let me know about their planned business strategy that 
would be in place from 1st of January. A well established and good operating system had 
given their work more structure, and compared to the year before, 2012, the rate of efficiency 
had increased a lot. Both Eivind and Helene commented on how they would be more stressed 
during busy periods the year before, and how they had achieved a better “flow” in their work. 
With the opportunity to increase workload, both Helene and Eivind had agreed that they were 
at stage where they had every possibility to expand their business further. Therefore, when 
two out of three partners of one of their hotel sub- suppliers contacted them about a possible 
merger, they were open for discussion. The sub- supplier was a Tanzanian tour operator 
business, marketing all round trips for foreign tourists in Tanzania. The business is run by 
three Norwegians, where two of them run the marketing part of the business from Norway, 
the third run their hotel in Tanzania. I have given the business the pseudonym “Jambo 
Tourism AS”.    
As a result of a conflict in interest among the three partners in the Jambo Tourism AS, two of 
the three Norwegian partners started reaching out to Paka Adventures. A discrete suggestion 
was given to Helene and Eivind about starting a joint venture through a merger of the two 
businesses. Eivind and Helene had been open to investors or partners for a while, and saw it 
as a good opportunity to have an exclusively promotional business in Norway doing 
marketing and finding customers for them. In October 2013 Eivind said the following; “The 
process is very exciting as well as emotional. We have invested a lot of money in our 
business, but more importantly a lot of work and energy. But we feel we are ready”. 
Through 2013, Paka Adventures and Jambo Tourism AS worked towards an agreement to 
establish a merger of their businesses to be able to start a joint venture in 2014. The first trip 
that Jambo Tourism AS sold for Paka Adventures was 1st of January 2014. Later the same 
month, both businesses attended the annual travel fare in Oslo, having two different stands to 
promote each of their businesses. This was done to try to gain twice the amount of potential 
customers. At this stage, both businesses had started collaborating 100% financially, meaning 
that Paka Adventures and Jambo Tourism AS shared all expenses and all profits.  In the short 
run this would be very favorable for Paka Adventures as they would receive profit from all of 
the sales that Jambo Toursim AS managed to sell, also to other places in the world. However, 
in the long run the partnership would seem to be more favorable to Jambo Tourism AS, as 
Paka Adventures had more specific plans to become a bigger business, generating a much 
higher profit, compared to the somewhat vague plans of Jambo Tourism AS. 
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Eivind and Helene started recognizing the risk they were taking if they were to accept the 
merger. The founders of Jambo Tourism AS were young and not properly established. In 
addition, the founders of Jambo Tourism AS were only working part time, which gave Eivind 
and Helene the impression they were not fully engaged to the development of their potential 
joint venture. Both Eivind and Helene still decided that their choice of doing a merger would 
be beneficial, they were ready for expanding their business more, and wanted to take the risk. 
The Lighthouse Beach Resort was not a part of the merger, and would still solely be owned 
by Eivind and Helene, so they viewed it as a minimal risk. 
In January 2014 I met with Eivind and Helene, as well as the two partners of Jambo Tourism 
AS, in Oslo. A proper strategy for continuing the merger among the two businesses had not 
been made at this point, although both businesses seemed eager about the future as a joint 
business. Later in march it was clear that the situation had changed, as Helene stated the 
following through an e-mail: 
In this moment we try to figure out what is most sensible. We see in a way that they 
(Jambo Tourism AS) do not have as much working capacity as we do and it has 
therefore not been as interesting for us to complete the merger with them, however, we 
look forward to a good collaboration. We still haven’t found the most sensible form of 
proceeding, as evidently they have less time and possess less capability to work with 
us than what our first impressions were. 
What was believed to be a good possibility of increasing the sales capacity of Paka 
Adventures turned out not to be the case. Jambo Tourism AS needed more help than first let 
on, and Eivind and Helene ended up working more on sales, and not less as they first had 
hoped.  If the partnership had proved to give more sales and income for Paka Adventures, it 
would have been ok for Eivind and Helene to share their resources in hope of growing bigger 
and stronger together with Jambo Tourism AS. Eivind and Helene instead found the merger to 
be too insecure and saw the potential fade during the process. They therefore discontinued the 
process of the merger, and chose to go back to the original agreement of collaborating as each 
other’s sub- suppliers. 
In June this year, a new opportunity came to Eivind and Helene’s attention. A safari business, 
which have been given the pseudonym “Simba AS”, were searching for someone to partner 
up with. The owner of Simba AS came from Europe and had developed a safari business with 
a strong network with many agents all around the world. He wanted someone to take over the 
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management of his business, as he currently plans to move back to his home country. 
Meetings and negotiations have taken place, and Eivind and Helene see this as a great 
opportunity to work towards a joint venture with an experienced company with good profit 
margins. The owner of Simba AS would be in charge of sales from Europe, and Eivind and 
Helene would run both Paka Adventures and Simba AS in Tanzania. Today the negotiations 
are going well, and Helene can report that, as symbol of the friendship between the 
businesses, the owner of Simba AS offered them a Safari car to a price that is much below 
what it originally is worth.  
Eivind and Helene will continue to work towards a potential merger with Simba AS. The 
main focus for the business will be to keep seeking for opportunities to expand marketing and 
sales potential internationally, and further, to keep growing and expanding their up and 
coming family business with Nazra and their two young children.  
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5. Analysis 
I will in this analysis discuss the entrepreneurial process of starting a business in an unknown 
culture. I will present an in depth look on how the skill of networking can play an essential 
role for foreign entrepreneurs in the process of becoming successful business owners in 
Tanzania. In order for me to understand the difficulty of starting a business in Tanzania and 
the challenges of business development throughout the stages of an entrepreneurial process, I 
deemed it important to understand the cultural context of doing business in Tanzania. I would 
through this understating be able to present a holistic discussion of my case study. The sub- 
chapters in this analysis are divided in accordance to the different stages of an entrepreneurial 
process and each stage include a sub- chapter of what has proven most interesting in each 
stage in regards to the use of networking and the impact of cultural elements and knowledge. 
Each of the three main sub- chapters includes a discussion of networking, and the influence of 
culture and knowledge to each stage respectively.  
There is a great need to make the process of starting a business easier, and lessen the risk to 
entrepreneurs, in order to improve the economic development of the country. As stated by the 
reports from The World Bank (2014a, 2014b), as presented in chapter 1, the business culture 
in Tanzania is saturated by distrust, and is in need of creating more support towards 
entrepreneurs. This distrust is detrimental to the further development of the economic climate 
in Tanzania. The culture of doing business in Tanzania therefore needs to be adjusted. In other 
words, in need to attract entrepreneurs in order of achieving the process of creative 
destruction, which will fuel economic development in the long term as explained through 
Schumpeter (1942) in chapter 2.  
It is apparent that the population in Tanzania experience corruption on an everyday basis, 
which is made clear by the results from the Transparency International Report (2014) 
presented in chapter 4. The inhabitants of Tanzania believe it is the government who are most 
capable to reduce and fight corruption. The high amount of small established businesses in 
Tanzania, in reference to The World Bank (2014a), is a result of people’s lack of choice, and 
need of earning a living; explained as push factors by Spilling (2008). The impact of 
corruption and insecurity, which influence the ease of doing business in Tanzania, can be 
understood as being part of the Tanzanian culture, as it is a part of the everyday life of the 
Tanzanian population. By discussing different situations presented in the case study narrative 
in chapter 4 within the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2, I am able to offer the 
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following analysis of an entrepreneurial process performed by two foreign entrepreneurs in 
Tanzania. 
5.1 Starting a Business  
In the process leading up to starting Paka Adventures in Tanzania, the entrepreneurs were 
influenced by the people around them, both in regards to their sense of belonging and to 
becoming alert to opportunities.  Figure 1 presents the limited network of Paka Adventures in 
their idea- generating stage. 
Figur 16: The network of Paka Adventures in the Idea- generating 
stage 
 
Source: Authors’ own research 
In the idea- generating stage there is one main similarity to be found with what 
Madurapperuma (2011) has called the discovery stage, and with what Greve and Salaff (2003) 
have called the motivation phase. The discovery stage and motivation phase is explained and 
discussed in chapter 2. The main gist of the theory was that; close friends and family were the 
key members of the network. In what I have called the idea- generating stage, I found the two 
Norwegian entrepreneurs to be mainly interacting with their local friends and foster daughter 
in Tanzania, as well as keeping in touch with their family in Norway in this first stage. I have 
concluded that the social capital of the two Norwegian entrepreneurs were influenced by 
73 
 
strong tie relations such as Nazra and their family in Norway, although, and in contrast to 
Maderapperuma (2008) and Greve and Salaff (2003),  I found their social capital to be highly 
influenced by weak tie relations as well. This is due to the short time the two Norwegian 
entrepreneurs had spent with their Tanzanian friends at that stage, and further, because of the 
conflicting situation in which they ended up in with Robert whom they considered to be a 
close native friend. According to the theory of Granovetter (1973), which I presented in 
chapter 2, the strength of ties can be measured in the amount of frequent interaction. As I will 
come back to, some of the weak ties from this stage do become strong ties during the 
entrepreneurial process.  
Madurapperuma (2011) found empirical evidence that entrepreneurs would be alert to the 
importance of expanding their network, due to the resources needed in later stages. As Paka 
Adventures were more in a state of being alert to opportunities, rather than understanding the 
importance of networking, the use of networking as a tool came more to the entrepreneur’s 
attention in the second stage, during the establishment of the business.   
Through years of social and cultural experiences together with people in Tanzania the two 
Norwegian entrepreneurs were not lacking the knowledge of interacting and creating new 
relations with Tanzanians. The two Norwegian entrepreneurs understood that they had the 
expertise to find and select trips which would be good matches for their particular visitors 
from Norway. They had also learned the skills necessary, to make a good all round trip for 
different people, through their friends and family, who came to visit. This type of knowledge 
combines both tacit and explicit knowledge, and is given the term human knowledge by De 
Long & Fahey (2000) as explained in chapter 2. The tacit knowledge of the two Norwegian 
entrepreneurs was fundamentally directed towards their experience and understanding of what 
their Norwegian friends and family would be satisfied with during their time in Tanzania. The 
explicit knowledge they accumulated was a result of performing safari tours with Robert, 
where they learned from his experience and expertise. By planning safari tours and activities 
on behalf of their guests, the two entrepreneurs combined their tacit and explicit knowledge. 
Based on the Norwegian entrepreneurs’ lack of business routines, specifications and task 
descriptions, their tacit, not yet codified knowledge, can be understood as much greater than 
their explicit knowledge. This is in accordance with Widding’s (2007) description of the first 
stage in establishing a business, which states that a start phase of a business have low 
competitive advantage, and lack of what Dollinger (1999) have called a viable knowledge 
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reservoir. The knowledge reservoir of Paka Adventures was limited at this stage, because of 
the little collaboration with the external actors in the business culture.  
In the following sub-chapter I will discuss the challenges the entrepreneurs behind Paka 
Adventures faced in the first stage of their entrepreneurial process. I will also discuss how 
their use of a weak and limited network, their lack of experience from doing business in the 
Tanzanian culture, as well as with a knowledge reservoir containing more tacit than explicit 
knowledge, had an impact on this stage. 
5.1.1 Depending on others 
The main factors that led the Norwegian couple to move to Tanzania, was their commitment 
to their foster daughter, Nazra, the land which had been purchased from the village leader in 
Kidagaa, as well as the climate which were beneficial to the health situation of one of the 
entrepreneurs. The two Norwegian entrepreneurs’ experiences from living and working in 
Tanzania created a social network for them. This network enabled them to discover their 
business opportunity in the tourism industry. Examples of this can be seen when one of the 
Norwegian entrepreneurs joined Robert on safari tours, and learned the trade of being a safari 
guide from him. Another example is the positive experience of planning activities for their 
friends and family who visited from Norway. The Norwegian entrepreneurs were more or less 
pulled towards the opportunity to create a better situation for themselves in Tanzania. This is 
what I have explained as pull factors through Spilling (2008) in chapter 2, were entrepreneurs 
are motivated to start a business. It can however be argued that the entrepreneurs were more 
or less forced by their situation to seek for business opportunities as well, as their attachment 
to Tanzania were strong. To be able to live in the country permanently the two Norwegian 
entrepreneurs were in need of a stable income, which would let them be able to build a life in 
Tanzania.  The two Norwegian entrepreneur’s interaction with the community, can therefore 
be understood as making it possible to recognize the opportunity for starting a business, as 
well as being the reason for starting a business altogether. 
Through socially interacting with the native locals in Kigamboni, as well as the relationship 
the two Norwegian entrepreneurs had gained with the village leader of Kidagaa, can be 
understood to have been an influential part of the entrepreneur’s social capital in the idea- 
generating stage. As mentioned through Greve and Salaff (2003) in chapter 2, the continuance 
of such frequent contact with people in the community can be explained to have created a 
support group for the two Norwegian entrepreneurs, in the sense that opportunities were made 
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available to them. This was mostly due to the fact that the land offered to one of the 
entrepreneurs, almost for free compared to its worth, at an early stage, gave them the 
opportunity to build The Lighthouse Beach Resort. This gesture can also be understood as 
being a part of what Anssi Paasi (1990/1991) has called material culture of a region, due to 
the meaning and sense of belonging in which the physical space of the Lighthouse Beach 
Resort would provide, both for the entrepreneurs and the Kigamboni community.  
An interesting question to ask is whether or not the village leader of Kidagaa saw potential in 
Eivind as being an active agent for promoting future development of the village, in relation to 
social capital, as presented through the theory of Krishna (2013) in chapter 2. This is a 
question that will remain unanswered however. The radical development ripple effects, which 
came from the establishment of The Lighthouse Beach Resort, have been the main factor in 
the challenge of describing the entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures as commercial or social 
entrepreneurs. In the idea- generating stage, the focus for the two Norwegian entrepreneurs 
was mostly on generating a profit to be able to make a life for themselves in Tanzania. On the 
other side, the development of Paka Adventures included the community in Kigamboni, 
especially the Kidagaa Village. It may seem as the process of including the community would 
not only provide a better economic climate for the surrounding community creating social 
value, it would also include the two Norwegian entrepreneurs to become a part of the 
community. Furthermore, an increased standard of living in the general Kigamboni area, as a 
lot of the social problems stemming in poverty disappear with the upstart of economic growth,  
would further make it a more desirable tourist destination. I will go into greater detail of why 
it became important to them to include the surrounding community in the chapter regarding 
the establishment phase. 
With the beneficial resources, which Robert and Frank provided through sharing their 
experiences and knowledge about doing business in Tanzania. The business idea can be 
understood to have emerged as a result of social capital, as the knowledge that was learned 
through interaction with the two native Tanzanians, Frank and Robert, led the entrepreneurs 
of Paka Adventures to become aware of their opportunities. Following the theory of DeLong 
and Fahey (2000) presented in chapter 2, the gained knowledge of creating the idea of Paka 
Adventures can be seen as a result of culture; the Tanzanian practices and norms of doing 
business through Frank and Robert’s experiences, as well as the Norwegian values of doing 
business through the two Norwegian entrepreneurs’ vision.  
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The entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures experienced the influence of corruption early in the 
idea- generating stage. Business actors in the community would take advantage of the 
country’s weak institutions, by bribing either members of police or immigration in an attempt 
to harm their business. The introduction of chapter 2 presented results from Transparency 
International (2012), proving how corruption is a big factor influencing the greater part of the 
adult population in Tanzania 
An example of this can be seen in the situation with Robert, when the entrepreneurs of Paka 
Adventures had an unpleasant encounter with both the police and immigration after they 
found out that Robert wanted to end his relationship with them. The knowledge they had 
trusted to Robert, about immigration papers that had been handed in to the immigration office, 
were taken advantage of. This caused damage directly for the entrepreneurs, in the sense that 
one of them was jailed. The two Norwegian entrepreneurs recognized the absence of 
institutional trust, and began to understand the risk of relying on one-sided trust as described 
by Anokihn & Schulze (2009) in chapter 2. In this situation it can be understood how the 
market of starting up a business became uncertain for the entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures, 
as they had been too naïve of their surroundings. Robert had sold his beach resort, in which 
Paka Adventures’ customers were supposed to be accommodated. In lack of relations with 
other businesses in the hotel industry which could function as their sub- suppliers and 
accommodate their guest, the two Norwegians faced market uncertainty as explained by 
Beckman et al. (2004).  The two Norwegian entrepreneurs’ lack of relations and experiences 
created this market uncertainty for their business, in regards to not have the knowledge on 
how the market would be able to accommodate their guests, as well as the lack of trust 
towards the culture of doing business. Referring to Beckman et.al (2004), the two Norwegian 
entrepreneurs choice to take control of accommodation themselves, can be expressed as 
taking upon an exploitation strategy in the sense of dealing with their current uncertainty of 
doing business in the Tanzanian tourism industry. The exploitation strategy would not reduce 
the market uncertainty, as will be discussed in the next subchapter where the establishment 
stage will be analyzed, although, it did bring forward the motivation of gaining control of 
their own beach resort, which later would reduce market uncertainty in the sense that they did 
not have to rely on other actors providing good accommodation for their guests.  
The lack of institutional trust had influenced the Norwegian entrepreneurs in the way that they 
learned to be more aware of whom to trust. In the absence of Robert’s knowledge, it is evident 
that the entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures found it necessary to exploit other relations in their 
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network. Through more frequent interaction with Frank led the entrepreneurs to discover the 
potential inherent in this local friend and employee. Frank’s use of smallchaps became 
immensely valuable, and in this first stage; especially in situations when the two Norwegian 
entrepreneurs faced trouble with immigration and police. Frank’s use of smallchaps and his 
success to solve problems can be understood as the Norwegian entrepreneurs start of 
recognizing networking as a tool to be used against conflicts and challenges in which corrupt 
actions were taken to harm their business. For example the multiple times that one of the 
entrepreneurs would be jailed, the entrepreneurs’ frequent surprise visits from immigration 
officers, or filing and pushing for different permits, were all situations that were handled with 
Frank’s smallchaps. . Thus, as stated by Rose- Ackerman (2001) in chapter 2, the trust 
towards Frank can be said to have grown, because of the two Norwegian entrepreneurs’ 
positive experiences with Frank. Furthermore, as will be discussed later in this analysis, 
Frank’s impact on the further development of the business idea became vital to their success. 
The beach resort can be understood to have been built through the exploitation of the existing 
network of the two Norwegian entrepreneurs. The learning curve throughout this first stage 
was very high and tacit, as explained through Mitra (2012) in chapter 2, as the Norwegian 
entrepreneurs were learning by doing. They practiced activities relevant to their potential 
business venture, especially when they didn’t have access to Robert’s experiences and inputs 
in regards to how to do business anymore. 
In general, what can be learned from this is how trust is needed to ensure that the limited 
network in the start- up stage of a business will not cause harm. For entrepreneurs starting up 
a business in Tanzania, it can deem important to build up trust with the people they are 
dependent on. Through the example of Paka Adventures, trust can be especially important 
when working to establish a business in an economic climate rife with corruption. In the wake 
of the conflict with Robert, the entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures objectively saw that the 
need of adapting themselves to the Tanzanian business culture, or a shared system of values, 
beliefs, and aspirations, referring to Hofstede (1980) in chapter 2, was essential. Therefore, 
recognizing the importance of cultural knowledge can be understood as a vital factor in the 
process of starting a business in an unknown culture. In the next sub- chapter I will further 
detail the important impact of local contacts on the establishment of Paka Adventures.  
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5.2 Developing a business 
The opportunity’s feasibility made the two Norwegian entrepreneurs mobilize their resources 
required to successfully pursue the opportunity to build their business. In accordance with 
Greve & Salaff (2003) in chapter 2, the entrepreneurs used their social capital to be able to 
start their business. In the second stage of their entrepreneurial process, the establishment 
stage, the network of Paka Adventures further grew, which will be discussed in this sub- 
chapter. Greve and Salaff (2003) have called their second phase for the planning phase, 
although in this case, their third phase called establishment, can also be included in what I 
have called the establishment stage in the entrepreneurial process of my case study. Therefore, 
both the first and second phase of Greve and Salaff (2003) will be included in this second 
stage, the stage of establishment. I will also draw attention to the empirical findings of 
Madurapperuma (2011), and what she has called the start- up stage. An illustration of the 
expanding network is illustrated in figure 17 below. 
Figur 17: The network of Paka Adventures in the establishment stage 
 
Source: Author’ own research 
The main changes in Paka Adventures’ network from the idea- generating stage, are the new 
relations with public institutions. Both the Norwegian Embassy, as well as the Norwegian 
entrepreneurs’ co-owner, and his connection to local institutions through his network of 
smallchaps. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs started collaborations towards other businesses, 
especially hotels and lodges, gaining a larger supply of activities and tours for their 
customers. The entrepreneurs’ friends and family in Norway played a good role in marketing 
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their business in Norway through the “word of mouth” strategy, recommending others to 
travel to Tanzania through Paka Adventures. The family was the most important factor to 
provide financial support in this stage as well.  
In accordance with empirical evidence from Greve and Salaff (2003), as well as 
Madurapperuma (2011) as discussed in chapter 2, the main focus of the entrepreneurs became 
to seek and maintain new relations, especially with business acquaintances and more formal 
institutions. Family would in this stage become less important in regards to social capital, 
although as mentioned, very important in regards to support with financial capital.  
Together with what De Long and Fahey (2000) have called human and collective knowledge, 
the two Norwegian entrepreneurs managed to expand their knowledge reservoir, thereby 
increasing their competitive advantage in the tourism industry in Tanzania. This is also in 
accordance with Widding’s (2007) theory on the result of opening more of the business’ gates 
towards the environment, enabling them to gain new and more diverse knowledge. For 
instance, the informative resources, which they gained through peoples’ advice on how to 
establish a business in Tanzania, and the material resources, which gave them the opportunity 
to give life to their business idea, created the fundament for being able to make their business 
sustainable.  In this stage, the experience of justifiable lack of trust towards the business 
culture in Tanzania caused constraints on the establishment process of the business, which 
made the entrepreneurs aware of the fundamental risk of doing business in Tanzania.  
The two Norwegian entrepreneurs were more or less forced to face the importance of 
networking due to the conflict with their collaborating partner Bambu Hotel. The result of this 
conflict led to a reorganizing of Paka Adventures, making the business 100% Tanzanian, 
gaining Frank as their co-owner, and more importantly, the entrepreneurs identified and 
attracted a highly educated board of trustees which provided them with a stronger, and sorely 
needed, knowledge reservoir. In accordance with both Widding (2007) and DeLong and 
Fahey (2000), the two Norwegian entrepreneurs started a process of identifying necessary 
knowledge which included new relations that would create more security towards their 
environment.  
Paka Adventures, in line with Widding’s (2007) second phase, now had opened more “gates” 
to their environment, including sub-suppliers and a larger staff, and would be in a better 
position as they could exploit knowledge through their board of trustees in order to start 
mechanisms that would protect their knowledge reservoir when it deemed necessary.  
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Collaboration with other businesses started in the establishment stage, as the entrepreneurs 
needed sub suppliers to be able to offer more of the value chain in the tourism industry in 
Tanzania to their customers.  It can be understood that the entrepreneurs used the form of 
exploration to find new partner relationships, as presented through Beckman et al (2004). For 
example, by contacting the Norwegian Embassy in Dar Es Salaam the two Norwegian 
entrepreneurs would benefit from the Norwegian business network of the embassy. In the case 
of corruption and high risk, one sided trust towards businesses with same values and efficient 
communication channels, as explained through Rose Ackerman (2001), would be easier for 
the entrepreneurs to rely on compared to local businesses. The business called Wild Tracks 
became a sub- supplier through e-mail correspondence, which can be explained through the 
theory of Licht and Siegel (2008), presented in chapter 2, as bounded solidarity. The 
Norwegian Embassy in Dar Es Salaam created an arena for Norwegian businesses to share a 
common event and exchange experiences. Furthermore, both the female owner of Wild 
Tracks as well as the two entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures share the same Norwegian 
values; the entrepreneurs where familiar with each other’s values and in a way this can 
explain the altruistic behavior generating trust through e-mail correspondence. Licht and 
Siegel (2008) called this value introjection. Another point can be how the entrepreneurs prefer 
to do business with other foreign entrepreneur, due to the cultural norms, values and practices 
of local businesses. The behavior of other businesses can be seen as more of a risk for the two 
Norwegian entrepreneurs to include in their network, and as culture is the basis for behavior, 
according to DeLong and Fahey (2000), collaborating with the Norwegian entrepreneur 
behind Wild Tracks may be more familiar, and easier to trust. 
To make it possible for new foreign entrepreneurs to be able to create a viable business in 
Tanzania, it can be understood from my findings so far that it is important for any business to 
create a network of their own. In principle it seems important to be aware of whom the 
entrepreneurs need to connect to, as well as selecting the right people for their network. 
Family, friends, the embassy, other businesses relevant to their own and institutions both 
administrative and political can be an important part of any business network. It is through 
this network entrepreneurs are able to expand their knowledge reservoir, through advice and 
general knowledge, and thereby increase their own competitive advantage. Through 
collaboration with other businesses new businesses can increase the level of what they 
themselves can offer.  As will be discussed in the next sub- chapter, the ability to trust 
network relations in a business culture soaked with corruption, can be understood as one of 
81 
 
the main situational challenges in which the entrepreneurs behind Paka Adventures would 
face during their business establishment process in Tanzania.  
5.2.1 Deception in Network 
In the establishment stage, both entrepreneurs gained valuable experiences of doing business 
in Tanzania, and they also became more integrated into the culture and the “way of doing 
things”. One example of this is how the entrepreneurs included the Kidagaa village to 
participate in the development of The Lighthouse Beach Resort. Not only did the 
entrepreneurs create business opportunities for the villagers, they created a more stable 
economy for the small community in Kigamboni. According to Certo and Miller’s (2008) 
definitions of social and commercial entrepreneurship, it can be discussed that Paka 
Adventures achieve the criteria to be called both a social- and commercial- entrepreneur, or a 
hybrid, as they generate both social value and financial capital. The reason for their focus on 
both social and financial capital can be seen as a result of their interaction with the 
community. Their social experiences and their growing network provide focus on needed 
social issues, as for example the need of education in the Kidagaa village. The two Norwegian 
entrepreneurs consistently encouraged collective processes and interaction during this stage, 
which supports the theory of Borch and Førde (2011), as opposed to looking just at 
individuals. 
The entrepreneurs’ business is built on family values where every employee is a member of 
the family, in other words, the business. Following Widding’s illustration of knowledge 
systems (2007) in figure 2, it is possible to understand how the strategy of using family values 
would benefit the business, especially in the two first stages of the entrepreneurial process. 
Paka Adventures was created from the ground up together with local Tanzanians. As the 
business grew, it became possible for more locals to take part in it. This is especially seen in 
the development process of The Lighthouse Beach Resort in respect of training and 
employing local villagers. The entrepreneurs identified the untapped potential of the village in 
Kidagaa. They therefore attracted this group by creating opportunities for their educational 
development through training, as well as giving them opportunity of employment and a steady 
income. With focus on treating employees as part of the development of the business, family 
values emerged, and this cultural impact gave the entrepreneurs a unique trademark to market. 
This can be described as exploiting the tacit knowledge of the employees, or as presented by 
Anokihn and Schulze (2009) in chapter 2, the entrepreneurs had, through positive 
experiences, gained confidence in the trustworthiness of the employees. The family oriented 
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way of establishing a business provided them protection in a sense that employees would 
honor the family, and take part in its challenging and successful development. If someone 
would deceive the business family, a group pressure would emerge and the employee behind 
the deception had no other choice but to leave the business.  
Unreliable behavior within the business deemed always to be somewhat of a risk when 
expanding the number of staff. An example of unreliable behavior, as explained by Yamagishi 
(2011) in chapter 2, was the safari guide who abused his position in the business for his own 
personal gain. On one hand, the process of expanding the number of staff can create a 
competitive advantage for the business, as with the employees creating a trustworthy and 
unique atmosphere giving innovative marketing benefits. On the other hand, opening the 
business to external sources, as with employing new employees, can be a risk as new 
employees may be unreliable, or in the case of Widding (2007): competitors may get access to 
the businesses’ knowledge reservoir. The situation where the employed safari guide carried 
out a Nigerian scam towards the two Norwegian entrepreneurs’ customers, makes it is evident 
that the employee took advantage of his employment, his fellow co- workers and the trust of 
his employers. The situation affected the business in a negative way, giving previous and 
potential customers’ reason to distrust the employees of Paka Adventures, and thus decreasing 
Paka Adventures’ competitive advantage in regards to losing marketing value. This situation 
however, identified Paka Adventures’ social capital in the tourism industry, and it can be 
understood as being what Licht and Siegel (2008) called enforceable trust as explained in 
chapter 2. The other businesses in the tourism industry in the Dar Es Salaam region 
recognized the inappropriate behavior which could very well harm the whole industry. They 
therefore acted collectively to punish the member of this industry, the Paka Adventures 
employee, who had demonstrated inappropriate behavior.  
Trust is an important factor of network, as pointed through Reiersen (2013) in chapter 2. The 
entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures gained a relationship with Bambu Hotel in the early stages 
of their business establishment. The assumption the two Norwegian entrepreneurs made, was 
that the hotel owner was honest. This assumption was based on the fact that acting “honestly” 
was in their interest.  The Norwegian entrepreneurs were managing a building project for the 
hotel, which the hotel would seemingly prioritize to finish sooner rather than later. In this 
situation, following the work of Yamagishi (1994), assurance exists, but not trust. It can be 
understood that the reason the two Norwegian entrepreneurs took on a building project for the 
Bambu Hotel, was based on their belief on the concept of mutual support. Licht and Siegel 
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(2008) call such social capital, where the generosity towards Bambu Hotel seemed to be 
beneficial towards Paka Adventures as well, as reciprocity exchanges, as explained in chapter 
2. However, when the culture itself is distrusting, the entrepreneurs would learn to be very 
cautious in regards to who they would trust. As with the building project with the Bambu 
Hotel, it could have been a successful and profitable opportunity, unfortunately it caused 
insecurity and conflict, as the entrepreneurs lost trust in the owners of the Bambu Hotel when 
receipt of project funding ended.  
The conflict with the Bambu Hotel did however make the entrepreneurs learn from experience 
of doing business in the corrupt Tanzanian culture. In a way, the situation can be understood 
as a form of integration. Through Anssi Paasi’s (1990/91) description of culture as a human 
act, it can be understood that the entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures started relating to their 
surroundings in regards to the challenging entrepreneurial culture surrounding them. The two 
Norwegian entrepreneurs became more alert to the entrepreneurial culture they were doing 
business in, as well as the bigger challenges of corruption, which would test their motivation 
of doing business in Tanzania.  
The knowledge they gained from the experience with Bambu Hotel served to better protect 
themselves and their resources. Following Yamagashi (2011), the unreliable behavior of the 
Bambu Hotel’s owners gave the entrepreneurs the need and wish, to form a stronger network 
to reduce social insecurity. The size of the entrepreneurs’ network was not large enough at 
this point, to be able to handle the conflict in an efficient way. Their employee and friend, 
Frank, did most of the work to prevent more involvement with police and immigration 
through the use of smallchaps. This was on the other hand much more time consuming, 
compared to having a more influential network of players. Referring to Spilling (2008) in 
chapter 2, in the wake of this conflict the entrepreneurs created a strategic assessment of how 
they should protect their business from any potential future conflicts. Being a small business 
with weak resources and a lack of capability to protect themselves against external threats set 
their potential growth on hold. The entrepreneurs understood that to be safe and to protect 
their customers and resources, they needed to gain a bigger network providing better security.  
Through exploitation and exploration of their network, the two Norwegian entrepreneurs 
started the process of reducing social uncertainty. By including Frank as an owner and 
changing their business from being Norwegian-Tanzanian to become 100% Tanzanian, 
getting a board of trustees, being more selective of collaborating partners and staff, and 
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starting to have a main focus on expanding their network, the entrepreneurs managed to 
strengthen their “gates” and gained more control and security internally in the business. By 
doing this, the entrepreneurs achieved a better flow of knowledge sharing internally, and a 
better control of knowledge sharing externally to other actors in the environment. The gate- 
keeping became structured, in accordance with the middle phase of Widding (2007), and they 
could focus on achieving growth with a higher sense of control and security. 
Not all foreign entrepreneurs may be able to, or even desire involving the local community in 
the business, the same way Paka Adventures did. Since the Norwegian entrepreneurs’ vision 
was the inclusion of the community, they were able to create a business built on the notion of 
family. Trust in that case is extremely important, it is however often not possible to have that 
degree of trust. Often, decisions made on the assumption of mutual benefit do not pan out. It 
is therefore very important for new entrepreneurs to have a clear picture of the risk of 
corruption and less than serious businesses, in the regions they are situated in. The strategy 
made by Paka Adventures to limit the risk associated with corruption and “shady” businesses, 
was effective in their case. It is however, not always possible to do what Paka Adventures did, 
when making the business 100 percent native. New businesses can, on the other hand, limit 
the risk substantially, by creating their own highly skilled network, and become more 
selective of collaborating partners.  
As mentioned in the theory chapter, Mitra (2012) provide three main points as to why 
networking is important, which is consistent with my case study. First, when Paka Adventures 
had been established, the conflicts that followed from their falling out with the Bambu Hotel, 
created a situation that made them vulnerable. This experience tested their knowledge of the 
environment they wanted to establish their business in, and they needed to make big changes, 
and they even ended up reconstructing the whole business. The need to protect themselves, as 
well as their services, made them turn to networking to increase their knowledge reservoir. 
The entrepreneurs needed to prepare themselves to handle any future conflict, and by 
increasing their network they also managed to prove their legitimacy to the society, even 
resulting in them becoming a “big brother” for other tourism companies.  
Second, the entrepreneurs focused on their Tanzanian co- owner’s ability to work the 
government system, by doing networking in immigration and other government institutions. 
Frank’s use of smallchaps became vital to many situations during their establishment. The 
building of the Lighthouse Beach Resort became the number one priority investment in this 
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stage, and Frank pushed forward the processes for water permits, alcohol permits, tax papers 
and everything else they needed by engaging his network of smallchaps. In weak government 
institutions, as Mitra (2012) also writes, the development and sharing of resources can 
become difficult as some businesses may want to dominate the market, using a weak and 
corrupt governance environment to their advantage, as the situation with both Robert and the 
owners of the Bambu Hotel.  
Third, the last important aspect of networking, according to Mitra (2012), is the emergence of 
internet. Eivind and Helene started very early by marketing themselves on their website and 
on social medias to gain customers. The frequent customer communication through e-mail, 
became a valued trademark for the business, providing all customers with their own 
customized trips. Comparing themselves with other Safari companies in Dar es Salaam, the 
entrepreneurs’ intellectual capital, in regards of using good e-mail communication to make a 
unique product for their customers, made them stand out. They found their niche in the 
tourism industry in Dar es Salaam. The knowledge needed to provide this service and secure 
satisfied customers was and still is vital for the business, and the entrepreneurs could not trust 
others to have this sort of responsibility without the proper education and training. For 
example, the experience with their former employee using their e-mail platform to scam their 
previous and potential customers, created a risk that had the potential of harming their 
credibility towards their customer network. The internet site Trip Adviser, is an example of 
how the internet can increase or decrease the entrepreneurs’ “word of mouth” marketing 
strategy.  
As explained in chapter 1, Tanzania is a country in rapid economic growth, and there has 
risen a particular interest in entrepreneurial activity taking place in the emerging economy and 
further development of Tanzania. The challenge the two Norwegian entrepreneurs faced when 
establishing their business, was the breakdown of institutional ethics in which corruption is a 
substantial part of. In the establishment stage however, Frank would show the entrepreneurs 
his ability of exploiting his network of smallchaps. Frank’s use of smallchaps was employed 
to avoid taking part in- and even control- corruption, as explained in chapter 2, through Rose- 
Ackerman (2001). Frank could more or less control situations of high risk for the two 
Norwegian entrepreneurs, by using his grasroot level network to work the system. Choosing 
to use smallchaps, instead of succumbing to corruption, taught the entrepreneurs how to avoid 
taking part in corruption. This method would slow up the process of establishing their 
business, as opposed to paying someone to do their job faster. 
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5.3 Expanding a business 
In the growth and development stage, which Madurapperuma (2011) has called the ongoing 
stage, the entrepreneurs’ network has grown substantially, as shown in figure 3.  
Figur 18: The network of Paka Adventures in the growth and 
development stage 
 
Source: Authors’ own research 
Both sub- suppliers and the number of employees have grown at a rapid rate, comparable to 
the growth of Paka Adventures. The main differences in the network from the establishment 
stage are the potential partners’ post, which include the tourism businesses Simba AS and 
previous sub- supplier; Jambo AS. In figure 3, the strong relations are marked with a thick 
line, and weak relations with a thin line. The owners of Paka Adventures have increased both 
weak and strong ties from last stage. Especially, the two Norwegian entrepreneurs have 
formed stronger relationship towards their uneducated employees, who have been with the 
business from the beginning. The need for educated staff increased during the establishment 
stage. The owners of Paka Adventures therefore decided to employ educated staff to ensure 
more professional quality in management of their office and their beach resort. These new 
weak relations provided the business with more stability in the sense of professionalism. New 
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sub- suppliers as well as potential partners are also other weak ties, which was of great 
importance in the growth and development stage. Frank still plays a valuable role in the 
business, although the two owners have taken some of his previous responsibility of hiring 
staff. This is due to the experience gained throughout their entrepreneurial process, making 
them more confident of using systems they have created to employ staff that can be trusted. 
What is interesting in the growth and development stage is how the entrepreneurs themselves 
have gained more control of their surroundings. The knowledge of doing business in Tanzania 
has increased, as well as the relations towards different actors in the Tanzanian environment. 
Through the establishment stage the entrepreneurs understood the importance of creating a 
network in the Tanzanian community to be able to secure their business, mostly due to 
corruption. A consequence of their networking has resulted in success of recognition. People 
in the community know who the owners of Paka Adventures are. The sub-suppliers have 
increased, more than is shown in this network, but more importantly, the seeking of 
partnership has become a main focus of being able to grow and develop their business. In this 
sub- chapter the focus will be on how Paka Adventures seek opportunities to be able to further 
develop their business and gain substantial growth. 
This stage of business are to a high degree similar to the empirical evidence of 
Madurapperuma’s (2011) ongoing stage, as the entrepreneurs have gained access to 
complementary resources and competences with sub- suppliers, and as the entrepreneurs 
currently attempt to establish a partnership with another business to expand their business. 
Thus, this proves the ongoing work of trying to maintain and develop relations towards 
professional bodies which will further enhance the entrepreneurs’ position in the environment. 
Following Granovetter’s theory of strong and weak ties (1973), it is evident that the quality of 
the entrepreneurs network has increased substantially since their official establishment in 
2007. By maintaining strong ties towards the people who have been in their network from the 
beginning, they continue to possess their knowledge in the firm. Due to the lack of diversity 
however, the entrepreneurs chose to focus on expanding their network in the establishment 
stage to include other groups or individuals’ knowledge that would be beneficial to the further 
development of their business. Such relations, as Granovetter (1973) has called weak ties, 
have given the entrepreneurs a source of more diverse knowledge in their current stage of 
growth and development. By maintaining strong ties, and constantly creating new tie 
relations, the entrepreneurs have created a more secure position in the environment. In 
88 
 
contrast to Greve and Salaff (2003), the role of networking can be understood to not have 
faded out in the third stage, the focus has however, turned to involve partnerships. 
The two Norwegian entrepreneurs are no longer dependent on specific knowledgeable others 
in the business, and if employees chose to quit the entrepreneurs are in a position of reduced 
risk to be affected in a negative way. This is in accordance with Widding’s (2007) third phase 
of competitive advantage of a business, as the explicit knowledge has increased. An example 
of a situation detrimental to their business, was the situation in the first stage; when Robert 
chose not to take part in the business, the business were set back in the form of the 
entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures feeling they were dependent on having the influence of a 
Tanzanian in their quest to do business in Tanzania. Frank would later take Robert’s place 
however, and if Frank had quit at that point, it would have had a huge impact on the 
establishment and development of Paka Adventures. This is in high contrast to their current 
situation, where the entrepreneurs themselves possess the knowledge and experience of 
managing their business in Tanzania. The work of Frank is still highly appreciated and 
valuable, although not at the same dependent level as in the early stages. 
It is evident that the two Norwegian entrepreneurs have become a part of the business culture 
in the third stage of their entrepreneurial process. Paka Adventures has achieved an internal 
business culture, which shapes the knowledge they gain. This is of great importance in order 
for them to develop and grow their business further. The Norwegian entrepreneurs’ values 
have defined what is important for Paka Adventures to achieve in Tanzania. The Tanzanian 
norms and practices, which the entrepreneurs have learned through the process, have been 
reformed from the Norwegian values as well. Trust is gained over time, as explained by Rose- 
Ackerman (2001) in chapter 2, and after some years in the business, the two Norwegian 
entrepreneurs’ main source of challenge; corruption, is no longer posing to be a great threat to 
their business. This is something Rose- Ackerman (2001) also suggest, that this can be the 
result of control, in the sense that the entrepreneurs have managed to control the degree of 
influence corruption can have on their business. In the first and second stage of doing 
business, Paka Adventures were in a fragile state due to the lack network resources and trust 
in their surroundings. In their current state, they have a strong network, providing protection 
and resources. For instance, the situation where the two Norwegian entrepreneurs were 
accused of frightening the animals with the color of their safari car risked to taint their 
reputation with customers. After pulling some strings through their network, they were able to 
document their case and prove the accusations to be wrong.  
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In addition, in the growth and development stage, the two Norwegian entrepreneurs can be 
said to have managed to create a lot more structure in their business’ systems, processes, tools 
and routines. This is especially evident in the organizing of employment processes, the 
running of their main office, as well as their employment of highly educated staff and their 
business being approved to teach Norwegian interns in tourism.  This is what has been called 
structured knowledge by De Long & Fahey (2000), as mentioned in chapter 2, and is explicit 
and rule- based knowledge. In the next sub- chapter, the two Norwegian entrepreneur’s ability 
of and aim towards attracting potential partners will be discussed. 
5.3.1 Attracting potential partners 
Through the two Norwegian entrepreneurs’ interaction with the communities surrounding 
their business, both in Dar es Salaam and in Kigmboni, they can be said to collectively have 
discovered their opportunities to both commercial and social profit. As explained by Spilling 
(2008) in chapter 2, a start-up should make a strategic assessment of how they relate to their 
surroundings. In this third stage, it is clear that the focus on generating social value for the 
community will continue to be in Paka Adventures’s plans for the future, as they wish to 
establish a village academy in Kigamboni. The value this can create to the community can 
boost the community’s future development. As Paka Adventures have focused on both social 
and commercial profit, they can be called a hybrid as: 1) without generating a commercial 
profit they would not be able to generate social value, and 2) without generating social profit 
they would not have been able to find their “niche” in the market, and further been able to 
generate commercial profit.   
The entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures have in other words become a great influence in the 
community. As Anssi Paassi (1991) explained as part of regional culture; the entrepreneurs 
are at a point in their entrepreneurial process in where they understand culture as an identity. 
With this follows both the objective view on how the entrepreneurs see themselves as 
residents in the region, where the entrepreneurs now see and experience themselves as a “big 
brother” to other tourism businesses, as well as comprehending the economic, cultural and 
political organizations and institutions in the region. The knowledge of regional culture and 
how to do business have become more sustainable with the entrepreneurs, meaning the 
entrepreneurs have more resources and have become more secure in the environment. The 
two Norwegian entrepreneurs can therefore be understood to have gained the necessary 
knowledge in order to be sustainable in the Tanzanian business culture. It is however, their 
dynamic capability, as explained through Teece et.al (1997) in chapter 2, of using their 
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knowledge that gives them competitive advantage in the tourism industry. By constantly 
identifying, attracting, exploiting and protecting their resources and gaining new knowledge, 
is the reason for Paka Adventures’ ability to continuously enhance their competitive 
advantage in the tourism industry in Tanzania.  
The enhanced position of the two Norwegian entrepreneurs put them in a position where they 
have a desire to expand their business further. Explained by Beckman et.al (2004) in chapter 
2, new partners can broaden the scope of the firm, increasing the likelihood of obtaining new 
information, and of adding to the diversity of information to which a firm is exposed. 
Considering a firm’s network as a knowledge base to be tapped, firms expand that knowledge 
base by forming new relationships with new partners. In 2013, their sub- supplier Jambo AS 
expressed their interest of creating a partnership. The uncertainty of dealing with new 
businesses did not affect the two Norwegian entrepreneurs’ decision to gain stronger relations 
with Jambo AS, as the purpose was not security, rather their desire to develop and grow their 
business were the motivational factor.  To some degree, this can be seen as a form of 
exploration according to Beckman et al (2004), as Jambo AS where an existing network 
member, and due to the fact that in the end it was an attempt at partnership but which later 
was resolved.  
The believed benefits of the merger included higher marketing value towards international 
customers and a big increase in sales. The entrepreneurs of Paka Adventures, however, 
experienced that uncertainty increased when the process of merging with Jambo AS began. 
The decision of ending the merger can be said to be based on, as mentioned through Mitra 
(2012) in chapter 2, the entrepreneurs’ tacit understanding of the information they learned; the 
entrepreneurs’ judgements of the signals they received from Jambo AS were not as satisfying 
as first thought. The attempt of merging with Jambo AS failed, but they remain on good terms 
and still collaborate with sales.  
The current situation, as of June 2014, Simba AS and Paka, have begun a process of creating 
stronger relational ties to each other, with the intention of testing the possibility of merging 
their businesses together. Simba AS is experiencing firm- specific uncertainty, as the owner 
desires to reduce his position as manager down to working in sales from Europe, and need 
another trusted party to run the business in Tanzania. Paka Adventures and Simba AS had no 
previous history of partnership or collaboration, and the relation was created through the 
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typical explorative form as described by Beckman et al. (2004), they have started interacting 
on a frequent basis, thus building trust through interaction.  
The two Norwegian entrepreneurs’ focus on networking in the establishment stage, and their 
continuously focus on broadening the focus towards creating partnerships in their current 
stage of growth, the entrepreneurs manage to control risk and keep connecting important 
resources to their business, which is in accordance to Widding (2007) in gaining and 
maintaining a comptetitve advantage, as well as Dollinger (1999) in the sense of expanding 
the business’ knowledge reservoir. Also, Paka Adventures may gain even more control of 
their business in the sense that future employees may come from their very own managed 
village academy.   
The term “untraded interdependency”, as referred to in chapter 2, sums up how the 
entrepreneurs’ knowledge sharing through networking, and the strategy of collaborating with 
competitors can be used to describe the entrepreneurs’ process of becoming successful in the 
Tanzanian culture. In Widding’s (2007) phase 3, the right side in figure 5, the processes have 
been further developed. The business experience breeds higher competitive advantage. The 
explicit knowledge has also increased, as the management wish is to reduce any risk that will 
follow if an employee chooses to leave the firm. 
The influence of trust in this thesis’ theoretical framework, both in network, culture and 
knowledge, has become evident throughout this analysis in all three stages of the 
entrepreneurial process, and has been illustrated in figure 19. The need to further address the 
impact of culture and knowledge on foreign entrepreneurs’ networking throughout an 
entrepreneurial process is therefore deemed important. I will now discuss trust and how it 
inter- relates through network, culture and knowledge during the different stages of the 
entrepreneurial process of Paka Adventures, and how it has affected the two Norwegian 
entrepreneurs’ current stage of growth.  
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Figur 19: The Role of Trust in Network, Knowledge and Culture 
 
Source: Author’s own research 
Figure 19 illustrates how trust plays a role in networks, cultural elements and knowledge 
creation. Through networking the entrepreneurs recognized how they could gain the 
knowledge they needed to be able to establish and develop their business. The risk of trusting 
other actors in the business culture was high in the first stage of the entrepreneurial process, 
but the more they expanded their network, the more knowledge resources they gained, and the 
more security was achieved. Trust in regards to sharing knowledge is still low as it is a huge 
risk, but their competitive advantage has increased from taking risks, and their current 
situation is favorable. The cultural factor of corruption may influence entrepreneurs to create 
network to gain social security. Lack of trust in the business culture, enhance the importance 
of strong tie relations, and further "push" entrepreneurs to gain social security through the use 
of networking. 
The entrepreneurs behind Paka Adventures increased trust towards doing business in an 
uncertain business culture by using network as a tool to provide them resources. In the first 
stage of the entrepreneurial process, the entrepreneurs were focused on seeking out a business 
opportunity, and had little knowledge of both the cultural elements affecting the way of doing 
business, as well as the use of networking. From the analysis the cultural elements can be said 
to have forced the entrepreneurs to use networking as a tool to protect the business from harm.  
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When the cultural elements proved to create risk in the second stage of the entrepreneurial 
process, the two Norwegian entrepreneurs recognized networking as a tool to be used to 
protect their establishment towards uncertainty. The lack of trust in the culture made it hard 
for the two Norwegian entrepreneurs to access tacit knowledge. The creation of strong ties 
therefore became very important in the first two stages of the entrepreneurial process.  In the 
last stage, security through networking had reduced social uncertainty and risk, and can be 
said to have made the entrepreneurs more confident towards the business culture. Cultural 
factors have been discussed to have an effect on behavior which influence the way 
entrepreneurs perceive, share and absorb knowledge. Cultural elements can therefore be 
understood to have given an impact on the entire entrepreneurial processes, especially in 
regards to the cultural element of corruption and its decreasing effect on economic growth, 
and therefore; on entrepreneurial processes.  
 
Lack of trust in the business culture, can be understood to enhance the risk of losing valuable 
knowledge to competitors.  Exchanging knowledge with foreign businesses seems to reduce 
the risk of knowledge sharing compared to sharing knowledge with local entrepreneurs and 
businesses. Knowledge gained from experiences of conflicts with local businesses may be the 
reason for this. In the sense of competitive advantage it has been understood to be gained 
from controlling the flow of knowledge being shared with other actors in the business culture. 
The more knowledge a business shares, the more risk, but the more knowledge the business 
will gain, which is good in the sense of further developing and growing a business. 
 
As I now have analyzed my empirical data within the theoretical framework presented in 
chapter 2, I find myself able to present the following overview: 
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Figur 20: Overview over main empirical findings 
 
Source: Author’s own research 
In the following chapter, chapter 6, I will summarize the main findings as well as present 
suggestions of further research. 
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6. Conclusive summary 
This thesis has examined the role of networking for foreign entrepreneurs in an unknown 
culture of doing business. In this chapter the aim is to provide a summary of the main findings 
that emerged from this thesis, and attempt to give an answer to this thesis’ research question; 
How does the role of networking change during different stages of the entrepreneurial 
process for foreign entrepreneurs in Tanzania, and to what degree does culture and 
knowledge impact this process? 
The field data of this thesis may suggest that the entrepreneurs had, in the idea generating 
stage, the financial and analytic skills to see an opportunity. They were able to analyze this 
opportunity’s feasibility, and they had the capacity to mobilize their social network to gain the 
resources required through social capital to successfully pursue the opportunity. In stage 1, the 
idea emerged as a result of exploiting the social capital of the entrepreneurs’ network. The 
opportunity of going through with the idea was formed through knowledge influenced by the 
behavior of the entrepreneurs’ social capital. The Norwegian values they had, were influenced 
by the norms and practices of native Tanzanians, as well as push and pull factors, which can 
be understood to have provided the possibility and motivation to seek out the idea of starting a 
business. 
In the establishment stage it is interesting to see how the entrepreneurs’ experience of distrust 
and deception in their network, internally as well as externally, encouraged the entrepreneurs 
to do more networking as a solution to grow the business so they would be less fragile to its 
environment, especially the influence of corruption. During this stage it is obvious how the 
choices made, set the fundament for the further development of the business. The experiences 
of social capital, and its meaning in terms of decreasing social uncertainty, became vital for 
their current stage of success. The entrepreneurs understood the importance of attracting 
resources through expanding their network. Focus was on gaining weak tie relations, which 
carried a certain amount of risk with it, although necessary, to be able to achieve more 
security from corruption. This can be very relevant for other foreign entrepreneurs to know. It 
is important to create a network of their own, consisting of the right people. Gaining favours 
by encouraging others to rely on them, in anticipation of reciprocity. Relying on the network 
is the key to success for many entrepreneurs. They are then able to increase their knowledge, 
thereby increasing their own competitive advantage, and avoiding the strain of corruption 
created by conflict as well.  
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In the growth and development stage, the third and current stage of Paka Adventures, it 
becomes clear how the entrepreneurs become more focused on creating formal connections, 
such as potential partners, to attract and exploit more knowledge and resources to be able to 
grow and further develop their business.  The focus is therefore on maintaining and expanding 
network in the sense of gaining growth. The level of social uncertainty has decreased, and the 
entrepreneurs strategically seek out social capital through more structural knowledge systems, 
and ensuring one sided trust can be used. Tanzanian norms and practices had been learned by 
the entrepreneurs, as the entrepreneurs had more influence and also more experience of 
relating to the Tanzanian culture as an identity. The norms and practices of Paka Adventures 
doing in Tanzania can be understood as shaped by Norwegian values through the 
entrepreneurs. 
The weak ties with the people in the Kigamboni community became stronger during the 
entrepreneurial process of Paka Adventures, and would influence the entrepreneurs to further 
keep a focus on creating social profit to the community, as well as commercial profit. By 
including the community in the business, the two Norwegian entrepreneurs managed to 
achieve a marketing edge in regards to their beach resort, due to the illiterate staff and their 
tacit knowledge resulting in the creation of what can only be understood as an unique 
atmosphere.  
From stage 1 it is evident that Paka Adventures had a weak business position. Through 
identifying resources through their limited network in Tanzania, they would however improve 
their position and start the second stage of attracting and exploiting resources through 
expanding their network. In this stage, they would learn how the environment would force 
them to better protect their resources through exploration of new network partners. As the 
business grew stronger, the entrepreneurs’ position expanded in the market, and they started 
stage 3 of the entrepreneurial process: looking to grow and develop themselves. This meant 
more resources to protect. From the above it can be understood that the bigger a business 
becomes the more capacity it has to protect itself from external factors in Tanzania through 
network insurance and better security systems. Smaller businesses may simply be seen as 
unable to do so, as they lack the capability and resources necessary.  
Networking has been an important factor in every stage of the Paka Adventures’ 
entrepreneurial process. Knowledge is a resource understood to be shared throughout the 
entrepreneurial process, but it needs to be protected from distrust in any business culture, 
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including interaction with public institutions, but also in collaboration with other business 
owners and the employment of staff. 
To be able to secure the business in an unstable business culture, networking has been the 
most important element to control. Cultural and environmental knowledge and experience is 
very important for any entrepreneur that wishes to establish a new business in Tanzania. 
Without such knowledge, the use of networking can create the necessary knowledge reservoir 
over time. Any challenges experienced by a business seemed to make the business more 
prepared.  As has been explained in this summary, networking in an unknown culture can 
provide the knowledge and security to be able to be successful, as well as it is evident that the 
degree of impact in which culture and knowledge has had in networks during an 
entrepreneurial process, adapt to each stage’s level of growth.  
6.4 Further research 
For further research it first would have been interesting to study the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and corruption, and see how entrepreneurship can be used actively as a tool 
by governments to increase or stabilize economic growth in weak business cultures. 
Second, to study the degree of social uncertainty created through corruption and how it 
influence small and medium sized businesses compared to larger businesses, would have been 
interesting. Third and last, qualitative research of the use of networks in larger businesses in 
unknown cultures, influenced by corruption, and their focus on creating social profit towards 
local communities, would have been interesting in regards to the ripple effects of such 
involvement. 
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Appendix 1: Semi- structured interview guide 
Introduction 
- Why start a business in Tanzania? 
- Idea  for business? 
Entrepreneurial process 
- Start up 
- Influence of community, positive/ negative? 
- Public institutions 
- Norms and practices of doing business 
- The role of networks 
- Local network 
- Important resources/ relations in the start up stage 
- Affective resources: support and encouragement 
- Informative resourcesr: bureaucratic, technical, financial consultation  
- Material resources: Financial capital, labor force, other input factors  
Key members of the business: Individuals who have been /still are of value to the 
establishment and development of the business.  
- Relationship- how did you get to know this/ these individuals? 
- Role in the business 
- Impact on the business 
How do you understand your network to take part in the business’ development? 
- Strategies 
- Choices of development 
- Innovation 
- Growth 
Society 
The influence of society in the development/ growth of your business. 
- Positive/ negative factors for development 
- Experiences/ situations 
- Support (knowledge sharing?)  
In what way does the society influence the further growth of your business? 
- Networking 
- Norms/ rules of doing business 
- Cultural differences 
- Public institutions? 
- Support (innovation Norway in Kenya) 
- Experience of corruption? 
- Competition in the tourism industry. (Comparative advantage)
  
Appendix 2: Open interview guide 
- Name 
- Education 
- Work background 
How did you get to know Eivind and Helene? 
What part of the business do you work with?  
What is your main role (function) in PAKA-adventures? 
What function do you play to PAKA-adventures networks for doing business in Tanzania?  
Have you brought with you your personal network to PAKA-adventures network? If so, what 
role did these people (your personal network) have for the development of PAKA? 
How does your personal network influence PAKA’s growth/ development/ strategy/ 
innovation? 
How do you feel that PAKA influence the society/community in Tanzania? Have they made 
any difference to the society, for people, yourself? 
What do you believe is most important for PAKA’s further development? 
 
 
